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AUTHOR: 


STINSON,  JOHN 
HARRISON 


TITLE: 


ETHICA 


PLACE: 


NEW  YORK 

DA  TE : 

1860 


COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARIES 
PRESERVATION  DEPARTMENT 


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Christian  ethics. 
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Madison  Ave.  and  49th  Street,  New  York 
Beside  the  main  topic,  this  book  also  treats  of 
Subject  No.  On  page  \  Subject  No.  Onpagt 


III 


tl 


I 


ETHICA, 


'  w 


/(;oi..cOl/i<. 


I. 


]S  \OKK. 


OUTLINE  OF  MOEA 


/ 


FOR 


STUDENTS  AND  REFLECTING  MEN, 


'•^ 


BY 


/ 


JOHN  H.  STINSON. 


NEW  YORK  : 

PUBLISHED   RY    A.    B.    KITSON, 

ROOM  20,  COOPER  INSTITUTE. 

1860. 


^V\''      ./     ■ 


I  I  I 


Entered  according  to  act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1860,  by 

JOHN  H.  STINSON, 

In  the  aerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  United  Stales  for  the  Southern 

District  of  New  York. 


I 


PREFACE. 


Moral  science  is  yet  in  its  infancy.  It  has  not  at  all  kept 
pace  with  the  progress  in  other  branches  of  learning.  And 
though  many  learned  and  ingenious  authors  have  appeared,  many  ^ 
of  its  elementary  principles  are  as  y.t  in  doubt.  To  obtain  a 
knowledge  of  truth  has  been  my  object  in  investigating  for  myself. 
Hoping  to  throw  some  light  into  the  minds  of  my  fellow  men,  I 
offer  this  little  outline  to  be  investigated  by  the  public.  If  what  I 
have  written  be  true,  it  appears  to  me  mankind  will  be  benefitted 
by  perusing  it.  If,  however,  it  should  be  found  that  I  have  faUen 
into  error,  it  will  not,  I  hope,  excite  prejudice  in  the  minds  of  mea 
against  others  who  may  be  more  successful  in  bringing  into  clear 
view  the  truths  of  this  most  noble  science.  Time  and  the  candid 
examination  of  intelligent  minds  will  test  it. 

The  Author. 

New  York  City,  June  1,  1860. 


J.  p.  PRALI.,  PRINTBR  BT  SHUll,  9  SPRUCE  STKEET. 


15133 


L 


I      1 


OUTLINE  OF  MORAl.  SCipCE. 

>  ■ 


PART  I. 


CHAPTER    I. 

ETHICS. 

Moral  Philosophy  is  that  science,  whose  object  is 
to  explain  the  laws  of  the  human  mind,  so  far  as 
morality  depends  upon  them  ;  and  to  seek  after  and 
illustrate  the  will  of  Deity  respecting  human  actions. 

Every  law  is  an  expression  of  the  will  of  an  intel- 
ligence. "  Municipal  law  is  a  rule  of  action  prescribed 
by  the  supreme  power  in  a  state,"  i.  e.  it  expresses  the 
wUl  of  the  legislature  ;  physical  law  is  an  expression 
of  the  will  of  Deity  respecting  matter  ;  mental  law 
is  an  expression  of  the  will  of  Providence  respecting 
the  condition  and  operation  of  the  mind  ;  and  moral 
law  is  an  expression  of  the  will  of  God  respecting  the 
actions  of  created  intelligences. 

Now  if  we  take  a  view  of  mankind,  and  compare 
him  with  other  animate  beings,  with  which  we  are 

2  . 


Ethica. 


familiar/we  will  perceive  that,  he  not  only  surpasses 
other  animals  in  intellectual  strength,  but  that,  he 
differs  widely  from  them  in  other  respects. 

Man- is  everywhere  a  worshiper;  a  being  who  has 
notions  of'rigiit  and  wrong,  and  of  justice,  and  who 
lays  down  certain  principles  for  liimself  and  follows 
them  ;  not  because  he  is  unavoidably  compelled  to  do 
so,  nor  because,  in  this  world,  it  is  always  his  interest, 
but  because  he  says.  It  is  right,  and  I  ought  to  do  it. 
Men  have  been  brought  to  the  stake,  and  asked  to 
renounce  certain  principles  which  they  had  adopted, 
but  they  said.  We  cannot  retract,  we  prefer  to  suffer 

torture. 

Now  to  explain  the  laws  of  mind,  upon  which  these 
phenomena  depend,  is  our  object  in  the  first  part  of 

this  work. 

In  moral  science,  it  is  taken  for  granted  that,  there 
is  an  intelligent  author  of  the  universe,  and  that,  all 
things  were  created  by  design.  And  hence,  when  we 
discover  that,  each  particle  of  matter  attracts  and  is 
attracted  by  every  other  particle,  we  know  that,  this 
law  of  the  material  universe  was  established  by  the 
will  of  Deity.  And  when  two  balls  of  matter  are 
made  to  impinge  against  each  bther,  action  and  re- 
action being  found  equal  and  in  opposite  directions,  we 
learn  another  law  of  matter  established  by  the  Deity. 
And  all  the  laws  in  physics  are  but  exhibitions  of  the 
will  of  the  Creator  respecting  matter. 

In  mental  philosophy  also,  we  are  made  acquainted 


Ethics. 


with  certain  laws,  which  show  us  tlie  will  of  the  Cre- 
ator respecting  our  mental  constitutions.     We  see, 
how  the  judgment  compares  ideas  and  traces  conse- 
quences ;  how  the  memory.recalls  ideas  for  reflection, 
and  how  the  imagination  pictures  to  jlis  scenes,  from 
which  we  are  far  removed.    These  things  are  but  ex- 
pressions of  the  will  of  Deity  respecting  the  mind. 
And  in  every  department  of  science,  wherever  there 
is  knowledge,  we  may  perceive  the  will  of  the  Creator. 
Now,  in  physics,  we  see  that,  all  matter  invariably 
obeys  the  laws  of  which  it  is  the  subject,  i.  e.  from 
necessity  conforms  to  the  will  of  the  Creator.   Beasts, 
also,  instinctively  lead  that  mode  of  life  which  the 
Creator  intended  for  them.      But  man  is  a  creature 
capable  of  conceiving  and  executiag  a  great  variety 
of  actions.     And  it  is  evidently  the  will  of  Deity  that 
man  should  not  execute  every  action  of  which  his 
mind  may  conceive.     For  instance,  it  was  evidently 
the  will  of  Deity  that,  man  should  live  in  the  world 
and  increase  in  number.     Were  it  not  so.  Ho  would 
not  have  made  male  and  female,  and  placed  them  on 
the  earth.    Had  the  progenitors  of  our  race,  therefore, 
committed  suicide,  we  cannot  doubt  that  they  would 
have  acted  contrary  to  the  Creator's  will.     To  seek 
after  and  illustrate  the  will  of  Deity  respecting  human 
actions,  is  our  object  in  the  second  part  of  this  work. 


8 


Ethica. 


.  * 


bHAPTEK    II. 

itfEjC  OF   THE   EXISTENCE   OF   DEITY. 


The  idea  of  the  existence  of  Deity  is  very  ancient 
among  men.     If  we  receive  the  Mosaic  account  of 
creati°on,  our  first  parents  had  it.   Or,  laying  aside  the 
account  by  Moses,  and  supposing  this  idea  to  be  innate, 
we  may  then  be  assured  that  each  individual  has  had 
it,  and  that  the  first  man  possessed  it.    But  if  we  sup- 
pose, with  Mr.  Locke,  that  man  has  no  innate  ideas, 
(and  this  opinion  is  well  established  among  meta- 
physicians,) it  is  still  evident  that,  the  idea  of  the 
existence  of  Deity  was  among  men  anterior  to  the 
fabled  existence  of  any.  of  the  gods  of  the  ancients. 
For,  the  ancients  either  originally  received  this  idea 
from  those  gods,  or  they  had  it  before  those  gods  were 
heard  of  among  them.   If  we  adopt  the  latter  hyphoth- 
esis,  then  this  idea  was  more  ancient  than  the  progen- 
itors of  Jupiter.    But  if  the  former  supposition  be 
received,  then  we  must  admit  that,  those  mythological 
gods  had  a  real  existence.    For,  a  man  cannot  receive 
the  idea  of  the  existence  of  a  chess-board  from  a  chess- 
board, if  there  really  did  no  chess-board  exist.  Neither 
could  the  ancients  originally  have  received  the  idea  of 
divinity  from  any  one  of  those  fabulous  deities,  when 
there  really  was  no  such  divinity  in  existence.   There- 


Idea  of  THE  Existence  of  Deity. 


fore,  men  must  have  originally  derived  the  idea  of 
Deity  from  some  other  source  than  the  existence  of 
fabulous  gods,  and  consequently  this  idea  is  more 
ancient  than  the  existence  of  such  gods  in  the  minds 
of  men. 

Now,  the  history  of  the  world  testifies  that  every' 
nation  and  tribe,  whose  mind  has  been  in  any  degree 
above  the  brute,  have  had  the  idea  of  the  existence  of 
Deity.  And  taking  it  for  granted  that  this  idea  is  not 
innate,  it  may  be  interesting  to  inquire,  very  briefly, 
in  what  way  mankind  first  obtained  it.  If  we  receive 
the  Mosaic  account,  God  made  himself  known  to 
Adam  ;  and  hence  this  idea  might  have  been  tradi- 
tionary among  his  children. 

Again:  God  talked  with  Noah,  commanding  him 
to  build  an  ark.  And  certainly,  a  matter  of  so  great 
importance  and  interest  would  be  frequently  spoken 
of  by  Noah,  and  again  by  his  cliildren.  But  in  a  very 
few  generations  from  Noah,  we  find  that  the  majority 
of  the  world^s  inhabitants  had  lost  the  true  idea  of  the 
Deity's  character,  and  worshiped  the  sun,  moon,  and 
imaginary  gods.  This,  perhaps,  may  be  accounted  for 
from  the  fact  that  traditionary  ideas  of  character 
might  easily  be  lost  by  people  depending  entirely  upon 
memory  for  their  perpetuity.  The  truths  of  mathe- 
matics and  philosophy,  if  lost,  may  be  again  discover- 
ed by  man's  ingenuity  ;  but  traditionary  facts,  if  once 
lost,  are  gone  forever,  unless  nature  furnish  the  data 
from  which  a.  posteriori  reasoning  may  be  able  to  lead 


10 


Ethica. 


us  back  to  them.  And  in  those  days  when  science 
had  not  yet  shed  her  light  in  the  mind,  men  could  not 
read  the  book  of  nature  and  from  it  discover  the 
character  of  nature's  author.  , 

But  traditionary  ideas  of  the  existence  of  Deity 
would  not  be  so  easily  lost.  For,  man  has  an  emo- 
tional nature,  and  he  is  surrounded  in  the  world  by 
many  things  which  call  forth  these  emotions.  And  if 
the  traditionary  idea  of  the  existence  of  Deity  were 
once  among  men,  the  phenomena  of  nature  would  be 
continually  calling  it  up  in  the  mind,  and  causing  them 

to  speak  of  it. 

Again  :  Following  the  Bible  account,  the  Deity  has 
had  direct  communication  with  various  prophets,  who 
have  not  only  taught  the  people  his  existence  and 
character,  but  have  also  made  known  many  ol  his 
designs.    And  that  the  Deity  should  thus  reveal  him- 
self  to  man,  has  been  received  as  probable  by  the 
world's  inhabitants.     For,  almost  every  people  on 
earth  have  had  propheU,  and  by  them  received  genmne 
or  suppositious  revelations.     But  again  :  If  we  believe 
with  many  of  the  ancients,  that  man  appeared  upon 
the  earth,  at  the  first,  a  mute  animal,  without  any 
knowledge  of  his  origin  or  destiny,  and  by  gradually 
progressing  he  attained  to  all  the  knowledge  which 
he  now  possesses,  the  following  hypotheses  may  be 
worthy  of  consideration. 

Socrates  endeavored  to  prove  to  Aristodemus  the 
existence  of  a  Creator  from  the  marks  of  design  ex- 


Idea  of  the  Existence  op  Deity. 


11 


hibited  in  creation.  This  argument  from  design  had 
been  thought  of  before  the  time  of  Socrates,  and  in 
recent  times  it  has  been  clearly  and  fully  illustrated 
by  Paley.  And  it  is  possible  that  mankind  might 
have  thus  derived  the  idea  of  the  Deity's  existence. 
In  all  nature  we  perceive  the  finest  mechanism  ;  one 
thing  made  with  an  exact  adaptation  to  another. 

But  it  is  evident,  that  before  this  argument  was  dis- 
covered or  appreciated,  men  must  have  had  consider- 
able intellectual  cultivation  ;  while  the  idea  of  Deity's 
existence,  most  probably,  commenced  in  a  very  rude 
and  ignorant  age.  And  even  though  a  few  master- 
minds should  have  obtained  this  idea,  it  is  not  very 
probable  that  the  mass  of  mankind  could  have  been 
made  to  appreciate  the  argument,  or  to  believe  the  phi- 
losophers. 

But  again  ;  in  this  world,  men  frequently  see  their 
best  laid  plans  frustrated,  their  expectations  blasted, 
and  their  brightest  hopes  extinguished.  And  in  the 
history  of  the  dead  and  among  the  living,  we  find 
many  men  attributing  their  misfortunes  to  inexorable 
fate.  In  such  a  mood  of  mind  it  might  be  natural  for 
men  to  suppose  that  there  was  a  superior  intelligence 
operating  against  them. 

But  again  ;  if  we  study  human  nature  we  will  find 
that  it  is  the  constitutional  bent  of  man  to  attribute 
animation  to  natural  phenomena,  which  are  not  under- 
stood, and  which  appear  strange  and  exciting.  The 
ancient  Greeks  supposed  the  electricity  excited  in 


12 


Ethica. 


amber  to  be  animation ;  and  this  tendency  of  mind 
may  be  noticed  in  all  ignorant  nations.    And  as  we 
go  back  in  the  world's  history,  we  find  that  the  farther 
we  go  back  the  stronger  were  the  emotions  raised  in 
men's  minds  by  natural  objects.    This  may  be  learned 
by  a  perusal  of  the  writings  of  the  ancients,  which  have 
come  down  to  us.     The  minds  of  the  ancient  Hebrew 
and  Greek  poets  were  undoubtedly  impressed  more 
strongly  than  the  most  sensitive  intellect  of  later  times. 
For/in  their  writings  we  find  the  greatest  number 
of  instances,  and  the  finest  specimens  of  the  sublime. 
And  in  those   ancient  days  before  science  had  ex- 
plained the  causes  of  things,  men  must  have  been  con- 
tinually excited  in  the  highest  degree.     Eclipses  of 
the  sun  and  moon,  hurricanes,  thunder  and  lightning, 
earthquakes,  etc.,  must  have  terribly  excited  them. 
And  in  such  cases,  nothing  could  be  more  natural  than 
to  suppose  these  phenomena  to  be  animated  beings 
possessed  of  superior  intelligence  and  power.     And 
so  far  as  we  can  learn  from  profane  history,  the  most 
ancient  worship  was  that  of  natural  phenomena,  to 
wit,  of  the  sun  and  moon.     And  when  knowledge  had 
increased,  it  would  be  a  natural  and  easy  transition  of 
mind,  to  suppose  these  phenomena  to  be  merely  agents 
of  the  will  of  a  ruling  intelligence.    For  our  purpose, 
however,- it  matters  not  in  what  manner  men  obtained 
the  idea  of  Deity's  existence.     All  we  need  is,  that 
his  existence  be  admitted,  and  that  the  idea  of  a 
divine  existence  be  among  men. 


Human  Action. 


13 


CHAPTER    III. 


HUMAN    ACTION. 

Human  action  is  an  effect  produced  by  the  exertion 
of  man.  And  as  all  exertion  which  man  can  put 
forth  originates  in  the  mind,  let  us  examine  the  mmd 
so  far  as  may  be  necessary  to  understand  in  what 
manner  actions  are  brought  about. 

The  mind  has  two  capacities  ;  the  one  active  and 
the  other  passive.     In  its  passive  capacity,  it  receives 
impressions  ;  and  these  impressions  produce  effects, 
according  to  the  laws  which  the  Deity  has  established. 
Thus :  if  rays  of  light  reflected  from  an  object,  enter 
the  eye  and  form  an  image  upon  the  retina,  and  the 
optic  nerve  be  perfect,  the  mind  receives  an  impres- 
sion ;  and  the  effect  produced  by  this  impression  is  the 
consequent  ideas  of  form  or  color.    And  if  any  sen- 
sation whatever  affect  the  body,  the  mind  in  its  passive 
capacity  receives  the  impression,  and  a  consequent 
effect  is  the  result.    Again  ;  the  mind  in  its  passive 
capacity  receives  impressions  from  mere  ideas,  and  the 
legitimate  effects  follow.     Thus :  by  listening  to  a 
witty  discourse  we  are  made  merry,  and  by  reading  a 
pathetic  tale  we  become  sad.    Let  us  next  point  out  a 
few  things  concerning  the  active  capacity  of  the  mind. 
And  first— of  conception.   By  conception  we  mean  that 


14 


Ethic  A. 


Human  Action. 


15 


power  which  the  mind  possesses  of  viewing  actions, 
circumstances,  relations,  etc.,  in  idea.  Thus :  it  a 
man  desire  to  fell  a  tree,  the.  mind  has  the  power  of 
viewing  that  action  in  idea,  before  it  has  been  acconi- 

Second-of  the  judgment.    The  power  of  judgment 
is  exercised  in  two  ways.     After  tlie  mind  lias  a  con- 
ception of  a  color,  a  solid,  grass,  tree,  etc.,  it  lias  the 
power  of  telling  whether  any  two  of  these  things 
acrree  or  disagree.    Again  ;  from  certain  known  laws 
the  mind  has  the  power  of  telling  what  consequent 
will  follow  a  given  antecedent.     Thus :  a  man  who 
sets  fire  to  a  barn,  can  easily  foretell,  from  the  hnown 
laws  of  combustion,  its  consequent  destruction.       ^ 

Third-of  ,the  will.  When  a  man  has  a  conception 
of  an  action,  the  mind  has  the  power  of  determining 
to  do,  or  to  refrain  from  it.  And  this  power  of  the 
mind  is  called  the  will.  These  remarks,  I  apprehend, 
will  be  sufficient  to  enable  us  to  trace  all  human 
actions  from  their  origin  in  the  mind  of  the  actor  to 
their  final  accomplishment. 

Now,  human  actions,  with  reference  to  the  mmd 
of  the  actor,  may  be  divided  into  three  classes,  viz  : 
intentional,  accidental  and  experimental  actions.  And 
First— of  intentional  actions.  First,  a  conception  of 
a  given  action  must  be  formed  in  the  mind  of  the 
acW  ;  second,  the  will  must  be  determined  to  accom- 
plish it  ;  then,  a  sufficient  knowledge  of  the  nature  of 
things  to  adopt  those  means  whose  inherent  ^qualities, 


if  properly  directed,  will  accomplish  the  will's  deter- 
mination ;  and  sufficient  skill  in  directing  these  qual- 
ities must  be  possessed,  or  the  action  cannot  b^ 
brought  about.  Thus  :  if  a  person  propose  to  shoot 
a  deer,  a  rifle,  gunpowder  and  lead,  are  his  means.  Of 
the  nature  of  these  he  must  have  sufficient  knowledge, 
and  he  must  also  have  sufficient  skill  in  directing  them. 

Now,  the  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  things,  is 
gained  by  reflecting  upon  the  impressions  received  by 
the  mind  in  its  passive  capacity,  L  e.,  by  experience. 

Skill,  is  the  making  things  square  with  sound  judg- 
ment. And  the  squaring  by  the  judgment  constitutes 
intention,  t.  e.,  the  adapting  means  to  accomplish  an 
end ;   as,  I  am  cutting  timber  with  the  intention  of 

building  a  house. 

Now,  whenever  an  intentional  action  has  been  ac- 
complished, the  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  things  has 
previously  been  obtained.  Hence,  the  conception,  the 
determination  of  the  will,  and  the  intention,  bring 
about  all  intentional  actions. 

Second -of  accidental  actions.  These  are  brought 
about  by  a  man's  aiming  to  produce  an  intentional 
action  ;  but  from  ignorance  of  the  nature  of  the 
means  employed,  from  unskillfulness  in  directing  the 
means,  or  from  the  unperceived  intervention  of  some 
object,  an  effect  is  produced  different  from  the  one  de- 
signed. Thus  :  if  a  man  aim  a  rifle  at  a  deer,  but  by 
the  ball's  touching  a  tree,  it  glances  and  kills  a  per- 
son ;  this  is  a  case  of  the  unperceived  intervention  of 


16 


Ethica. 


an  object.  Again  ;  if  a  physician  endeavor  to  restore 
a  sick  man  to  health,  but  through  ignorance  of  the 
disease,  or  of  the  properties  of  the  medicines,  he  ad- 
ministers that  which  will  have  a  contrary  effect  ;  this 
is  a  case  of  the  ignorance  of  the  means.  We  need 
not  illustrate  further. 

Third— of  experimental  actions.      And  these  are 
brought  about  when  a  man  puts  forth  exertion  to 
accomplish  an  intentional  action,  which  he  designs  to 
be  an  antecedent  to  some  consequent  one,  of  which,  as 
yet,  he  has  no  conception.    The  effects  produced  by 
experiments  in  chemistry  are  actions  of  this  kind,  to 
the  first  discoverer.    Thus  :  an  experimenter  may  put 
together  two  or  more  different  gases  to  see  what  will 
be  the  result.     Now,  he  has  already  obtained  the 
gases ;  and  the  putting  them  together  is  an  action 
which  he  understands ;  and  he  accomplishes  this  in- 
tentional action,  designing  it  as  an  antecedent  to  some 
consequent  effect,  with  which  he  desires  to  become 

acquainted.  . 

Having  said  this  much  concerning  actions,  with 
reference"  to  the  mind  of  the  actor,  let  us  now  con- 
sider them  with  reference  to  the  objects  upon  which 

they  are  produced. 

Now,  with  reference  to  the  objects,  actions  may  be 
divided  into  two  classes,  viz :  effects  produced  upon 
mind,  and  upon  matter.  And  when  any  effect  is  to 
be  produced  upon  mind  or  matter,  it  must  obviously 
be  brought  about  in  conformity  to  fixed  laws.    The 


Human  Action. 


17 


laws  of  mind  are  treated  of  in  works  upon  mental 
philosophy  ;  those  of  matter  in  works  upon  physics. 
These  laws  of  mind  and  of  matter  are  understood  to 
some  extent  by  the  unlettered.  At  the  present  state  of 
science  they  are  not  fully  understood  by  any  body. 

But,  I  apprehend  that  every  person^s  observation 
will  have  made  him  sufficiently  acquainted  with  these 
laws,  to  understand  the  manner  in  which  actions  are 
brought  about  upon  objects. 

Let  us,  first,  examine  in  what  manner  a  man  may 
produce  effects— actions,  upon  his  own  mind  ;  second, 
how  he  may  produce  actions  upon  the  minds  of  others  ; 
and  third,  in  what  manner  actions  upon  matter  are 
brought  about. 

If  a  person,  without  the  aid  of  instructors  or  books, 
investigate  a  subject  and  convince  himself  of  certain 
facts  or  conclusions,  of  which  he  was  ignorant  before, 
he  has  produced  an  effect  upon  liis  own  mind  ;  he  has 
accomplished  a  human  action  upon  his  mind.  •  Every 
discoverer,  in  this  manner,  produces  effects  upon  his 
mind.  But  a  man  may  produce  effects  upon  his  own  mind 
in  other  ways.  It  is  found  that  every  object  in  the 
universe,  when  it  impresses  the  mind,  produces  effects 
of  some  kind  or  other.  Mere  ideas,  as  we  remarked 
above,  produce  their  legitimate  effects.  Beauty,  de- 
formity, superiority,  intelligence,  stupidity,  &c.,  each 
affect  the  mind  in  a  certain  manner.  If  then,  a  man 
desire  to  produce  a  certain  effect  upon  his  own  mind, 
he  need  but  repeatedly  present  the  object  adapted  to 

3 


18 


Ethica. 


produce  tliis  effect,  and  the  action  will  follow.  For, 
by  the  laws  of  our  Constitution,  a  man  can  no  more 
present  to  his  mind,  even  in  idea,  any  object  without 
experiencing  the  mental  effect  which  the  object  is 
adapted  to  produce,  than  he  can  hold  a  live  coal  of  fire 
in  his  hand,  without  experiencing  the  physical  effect  it 
is  adapted  to  produce.  A  man,  however,  may  be  mas- 
ter of  himself  and  present  most  frequently  to  his  mind 
whatsoever  objects  or  ideas  he  may  choose,  and  con- 
sequently produce  most  frequently  those  effects  which 
he  may  desire.  Every  one  knows  that  man  has  pas- 
sions, and  that  there  are  objects  calculated  to  excite 
them.  The  devout  man  may  become  more  devout  by 
reflecting  upon  divinity ;  the  wicked  man  may  become 
more  wicked  by  reflecting  upon  crime,  and  happily,  the 
latter,  by  checking  his  mind  and  reflecting  upon  noble 
objects,  may  produce  opposite  effects,  and  change  his 
own  character. 

Hence,  a  man  may  bring  any  object  to  produce  sen- 
sation upon  his  body,  or  he  may  hold  before  his  mind 
ideas  of  real  or  imaginary  objects,  and  by  so  doing 
produce  effects  upon  his  own  mind.  The  active  capaci- 
ty of  the  mind  may,  therefore,  be  brought  to  bear  upon 
its  passive  capacity,  and  thus  produce  effects  upon 
itself. 

Let  us  next  examine  in  what  manner  a  man  may  pro- 
duce effects  upon  the  minds  of  others.  And  as  all 
exertion  originates  in  the  mind,  when  this  exertion 
makes  to  accomplish  an  action  externally  upon  mind 


Human  Action. 


19 


or  matter,  the  first  effect  is  the  putting  the  corporeal 
faculties  of  the  actor  in  motion.    Hence  the  corporeal 
faculties  of  an  actor  are  active  media,  while  those  of 
the  recipient  are  passive  media,  in  all  human  actions 
produced  by  one  mind  upon  another.     And  for  pro- 
ducing actions  upon  the  minds  of  others,  the  means 
made  use  of  are  oral  conversation  and  instruction, 
signs  and  motions  of  the  hands  and  face,  as  used  by 
the  deaf;   written  signs,  as  algebraic  formulae  and  the 
diagrams  in  several  of  the  sciences ;  experiments  ex- 
hibited to  the  senses  ;  and  written  language.    By 
the  use  of  these  means,  men  may  produce  On  the  minds 
of  others  almost  every  effect  which  the  human  mind  is 
capable  of  receiving.     One  man  may,  viva  voce^  teach 
science  to  others  ;  another  may  lead  the  minds  of  his 
fellow  men  into  error  ;  passions  may  be  inflamed  by 
oral  or  written  compositions ;  prejudices  may  be  awak- 
ened or  eradicated  by  books  ;  and  aversions  may  be 
produced  even  by  jesture.    Since  the  invention  of  the 
printing  press,  the  facility  for  producing  effects  upon 
mind  has  been  astonishingly  increased. 

A  single  though  t  conveyed  by  language  written  upon 
paper,  will  frequently  produce  effects  upon  millions 

of  minds. 

Let  us  next  consider  actions  upon  matter.  All  ex- 
ertion originates  in  the  mind  ;  the  first  effect  produc- 
ed upon  matter  by  this  exertion  is  the  putting  the  body 
in  motion.  Thus,  if  a  man  desire  to  pick  up  a  stick, 
the  exertion  of  mind  first  moves  and  directs  the  arms 


20 


Ethic  A. 


and  hands,  and  these  then  move  the  stick.  And  it  is 
obvious,  that  if  the  human  mind  were  not  thus  myste- 
riously connected  with  a  material  mechanism,  whose 
forces  it  can  employ,  it  could  produce  no  effect  what- 
ever upon  external  objects.  Hence,  from  what  we  have 
said,  it  will  be  easy  to  understand  in  what  manner  all 
human  actions  upon  matter  are  brought  about.  The 
exertion  of  the  mind  puts  into  operation  the  mechanical 
forces  of  the  body,  and  directs  them  to  a  given  object ; 
this  object  possesses  inherent  qualities  which  the 
forces  of  the  body  direct,  and  so  on  until  the  final 
action  has  been  accomplished. 

Hence,  all  human  actions  upon  matter  are  brought 
about  by  the  powers  of  qualities  of  objects,  and  by 
powers  obtained  from  mechanical  arrangements  of 
materials,  which  powers  are  put  in  force  and  direct- 
ed by  the  exertion  of  the  human  mind. 


Right  and  Wrong. 


21 


CHAPTER   IV 


OF  RIGHT  AND   WRONG. 


Eight  and  wrong  are  ideas.  They  are  not  affec- 
tions, emotions  or  impulses.  And  like  all  ideas,  iliey 
are  derived  in  some  manner.  Let  us  inquire  then,  in 
what  manner  these  ideas  are  obtained.  Take  a  par- 
ticular case.  Two  boys  bring  their  slates  with  a  cer- 
tain arithmetical  question  upon  them  to  the  teacher, 
who,  after  examining  them,  pronounces  the  first  boy's 
work  to  be  right,  and  the  other's  to  be  wrong.  Now, 
what  does  right  and  wrong  mean  here  ?  I  apprehend 
any  person  who  reflects  upon  the  question,  will  say, 
that  the  teacher  pronounced  the  first  boy's  work  to  be 
right  because  it  conformed  to  the  established  rules  of 
I  arithmetic  ;  and  the  other's  wrong,  because  it  did  not 
conform  to  these  rules.  Right,  then,  in  this  case,  is 
conformity  to  the  rules  of  arithmetic  ;  and  wrong,  non- 
conformity. Take  another.  Two  pupils  endeavor  to 
play  a  piece  of  music  upon  the  piano,  the  teacher  look- 
ing on,  says  to  the  first,  you  play  it  right,  and  to  the 
second,  you  play  it  wrong.  In  this  case,  it  is  evident 
that  right  and  wrong  are  determined  by  the  conform- 
ity or  nonconformity  to  the  rules  of  music.  Take  an 
other  case.  Two  men  start  from  Philadelphia,  to  go 
to  Reading  ;  the  one  travels  on  the  Reading  turnpike, 


22 


Ethica. 


Right  and  Wrong. 


23 


but  the  other  steers  his  course  through  New  Jersey. 
After  travelling  a  few  hours,  the  first  inquires  if  he  be 
on  the  right  road,  and  is  told  that  he  is  ;  the  second 
also  inquires,  and  is  told  that  he  is  wrong.  Here 
right  and  wrong  are  conformity  or  nonconformity  to 
geographical  lines.  And  we  might  produce  thousands 
of  cases,  and  we  would  always  find  that  right  is  con- 
formfty  to  some  established  rule,  law,  or  demarkation. 
And  it  is  plain  that,  there  are  a  great  many  kinds 
of  right ;  each  differing  from  others,  as  the  conformity 
is  to  different  rules,  laws  or  demarkations.  There  is 
physical  right,  t.  e.  conformity  to  the  laws  of  physics, 
mental  right,  geographical  right,  mathematical  right, 
mechanical  right,  &c.  And  each  of  these  rights  has 
its  corresponding  wrong.  And  Blackstone  divides 
the  wrongs,  of  which  municipal  law  takes  cognizance, 
into  mala  per  se  and  mala  prohibita  ;  the  first  being 
a  violation  of  the  laws  of  God,  and  the  latter,  of  the 
laws  of  man.  Let  us  now  consider  what  we  mean  by 
moral  right  and  wrong.  And  moral  right  and  wrong 
I  apprehend,  are  determined  in  the  same  manner  that 
all  other  rights  and  wrongs  are  ;  the  conformity  or 
nonconformity  being  to  the  will  of  Deity.  And  wheth- 
er any  action  be  morally  right  or  wrong,  can  be  ascer- 
tained only  by  comparing  it  with  this  standard.  Now 
I  apprehend,  it  will  be  admitted  by  every  person  who 
reflects,  that  the  will  of  Deity,  if  known,  is  a  sure  rule 
in  all  cases.  And  no  person  will  presume  to  judge 
the  Almighty  in  any  case.     The  will  of  Deity,  then,  is 


conclusive  and  ultimative.    And  that  all  men  do  ob- 
tain  their  ideas  of  moral  right  and  wrong  in  this  man- 
ner  is  abundantly  proved  by  facts.     Do  not  all  Chris- 
tains  search  the  scriptures  to  discover  God's  revealed 
will  that  they  may  know  whether  certain  actions  be 
morklly  right  or  wrong  ?    And  is  not  the  difference  of 
opinion  respecting  the  Deity's  will,  the  very  thing  that 
makes  one  denomination  act  in  a  manner  different 
from  another?    Is  not  the  Baptist  immersed,  and  the 
Episcopalian  confirmed  by  a  bishop  because  each 
thinks  he  is  acting  in  conformity  to  the  will  of  God, 
and  therefore  it  is  morally  right?    Do  not  all  men 
throughout  the  world  shape  their  actions,  when  they 
act  in  view  of  moral  obligation,  to  the  will  or  to  what 
they  suppose  to  be  the  will  of  Deity?    And  if  we  ob- 
serve a  child,  I  apprehend  we  must  discover,  that 
it  will  imitate  any  action  which  it  sees  others  do  ;  and 
though  it  may  be  restrained  by  fear,  it  will  not  refrain 
from  that  action  on  moral  principle  until  there  is  in- 
stilled into  its  mind,  that  there  is  a  good  man  or  Deity 
who  ever  sees  it,  and  frowns  upon  such  actions.     And 
I  apprehend,  we  have  many  ideas  which  are  derived 
by  a  process  precisely  similar  to  that  of  right  and 
wrong.    For  instance,  how  do  we  derive  the  idea  of 
difference  ?    Wo  evidently  think  of  one  thing  and  then 
another,  and  compare  the  one  with  the  other.     And  if 
the  mind  did  not  use  this  process,  we  could  have  no 
idea  of  difference.    So  also  of  resemblance  of  conform- 
ity, of  contingency,  and  many  others.    And  in  this 


24 


li^THICA. 


Right  and  Wrong. 


25 


:^ 


manner,  I  apprehend,  we  derive  the  ideas  of  all  kinds 
of  right  and  wrong.  And  from  this,  it  follows,  that 
if  men  cannot  agree  respecting  the  will  of  Deity  con- 
cerning a  given  action,  they  never  can  agree  respect- 
ing the  moral  quality  of  that  action.  And  hence  the 
fact,  that  v^hat  is  regarded  as  evidently  morally  right 
by  one  set  of  men,  is  regarded  as  evidently  morally 
wrong  by  another,  is  easily  accounted  for.  This  con- 
trariety of  opinion  always  has  existed,  and  always 
must  exist,  until  the  real  will  of  Deity  shall  be  made 
evident  to  the  minds  of  all*  men.  And  this,  I  appre- 
hend, explains  all  the  phenomena  of  moral  right  and 
wrong  which  exist  in  the  world. 

It  will  be  perceived,  that  the  human  mind  might  de- 
rive ideas  of  all  kinds  of  right  except  moral  right, 
were  there  no  idea  of  the  existence  of  the  Deity  in  the 
world.  But  were  all  ideas  of  Deity  blotted  from  the 
mind,  moral  right  and  wrong  would  be  swept  away 
with  them.  And  as  the  Deity  is  the  creator  of  all 
things,  moral  law,  which  expresses  the  Deity's  will 
respecting  human  actions,  cannot  clash  with  any  men- 
tal or  physical  law.  And  so  far  as  men  would  obey 
the  mental  and  physical  laws  of  their  constitution,  thus 
far  but  no  farther,  they  would  obey  moral  law.  But 
we  must  notice  some  of  the  objections  to  what  we  have 
said.  Examples  from  ancient  Greece  and  Rome  are 
brought  forward  to  show  that  men  do  not  derive  their 
notions  of  moral  right  from  the  Deity. 

"  The  paganism  of  the  ancient  world  produced,  in- 


deed, abominable  gods,  who  on  earth  would  have  been 
shunned  or  punished  as  monsters  ;  and  who  offered  as 
a  picture  of  supreme  happiness,  only  crimes  to  commit 
and  passions  to  satiate.    But  vice  armed  with  this 
sacred  authority  descended  in  vain  from  the  eternal 
abode  ;  she  found  in  the  heart  of  man  a  moral  instinct 
to  repel  her.    The  continence  of  Xenocrates  was  ad- 
mired by  those  who  celebrated  the  debaucheries  of  Ju- 
piter.   The  chaste  Lucretia  adored  the  unchaste  Ve- 
nus.    The  most  intrepid  Roman  sacrificed  to  fear. 
He  invoked  the  god  who  dethroned  his  father,  and  died 
without  a  murmur  by  the  hand  of  his  own.    The  most 
contemptible  divinities  were  served  by  the  greatest 
men.    The  holy  voice  of  nature  stronger  than  that  of 
the  gods,  made  itself  heard  and  respected  and  obeyed 
on  earth,  and  seemed  to  banish  to  the  confines  of  hea- 
ven, guilt  and  the  guilty."*    This  argument  seems  to 
show  that  men  do  not  derive  the  ideas  of  moral  right 
and  wrong  from  what  is,  or  what  they  suppose  to  be, 
the  will  of  Deity,  but  that  these  ideas  are  derived  from 
our  constitution.    It  must  be  recollected,  however, 
that  the  idea  of  Deity  was  among  men  long  before  the 
existence  of  the  gods  spoken  of  by  Rosseau. 

Mythologists  suppose  that  those  gods  were  once 
men  who  had  acted  a  conspicuous  part  on  earth,  and 
after  death  had  been  deified.  However  this  may  be, 
it  is  at  least  evident,  that  the  ancient  pagans  at  some 

c  Quoted  from  Rosseau  by  "Wayland. 


26 


Ethica. 


period  made  those  gods.  And  of  course,  they  must 
have  had  previous  ideas  of  divinity,  or  they  could  have 
deified  nothing.  The  idea  must  always  exist,  before 
it  can  be  given  habitation  or  character. 

Greece  indeed,  attributed  human  passions  of  the 
basest  sort  to  a  divine  existence.  But  the  idea  of  a 
divine  existence  was  not  derived  from  those  gods.  On 
the  contrary  those  gods  originated  from  this  idea. 
And  Greece  herself  made  them,  prescribed  laws  for 
them,  assigned  them  their  dominion,  and  attributed  to 
them  actions.  And  had  every  idea  of  those  fabulous 
gods  been  blotted  from  the  mind  of  the  pagan  world, 
the  idea  of  divinity  would  have  remained.  When  the 
religion  of  a  country  changes,  all  that  makes  part  of 
that  religion  is  frequently  swept  away.  The  idea  of 
divinity,  however,  which  is  the  foundation  of  every  re- 
ligion, remains ;  and  upon  this  the  succeeding  religion 
is  reared.  When  the  pagan  religion  fell,  the  gods 
were  annihilated,  for  they  were  but  part  of  a  religious 
structure,  and  not  the  foundation  upon  which  the 
structure  was  built.  A  substratum  of  a  crude  natural 
theology  underlies  every  religion  which  has  or  does 
exist  in  the  world.  Again,  the  great  men  of  Greece 
and  Kome  had  an  idea  of  Deity  entirely  distinct  and 
exclusive  of  those  fabled  gods,  as  taught  by  my tholo- 
gist,  poet  or  priest. 

The  idea  of  the  existence  of  a  divine  intelligence, 
who  had  created  all  things,  existed  in  Egypt  before 
the  Grecian  history  commences.    And  in  Greece  this 


Eight  and  Wrong. 


27 


idea  was  believed  and  taught  by  Thales,  by  Anaxago- 
ras,  Socrates,  and  by  Plato  and  the  whole  Socratic 
school.    Subsequently  the  Roman  philosophers  taught 
the  same  thing.    Again,  it  is  not  the  fact,  that  the 
ideas  which  the  great  men  of  Greece  and  Rome  enter- 
tained respecting  the  character  of  Divinity,   corres- 
ponded at  all  with  the  characters  which  the  mytholo- 
gists,  poets  and  priests  attributed  to  the  gods.    The 
writings  of  Plato  and  Cicero  exhibit  far  nobler  notions. 
And  respecting  those  gods  themselves,  the  same  lan- 
guage which  in  a  later  period  of  Roman  history.  Gib- 
bon applies  to  the  men  of  Rome,  may  with  much  pro- 
priety be  applied  to  the  more  ancient  history  of  Rome 
and  Greece.  "  Many,"  says  Gibbon,  "  considered  them 
(the  religions  of  polytheism)  as  equally  true,  many  as 
equally  false,  and  many  as  equal  1  y  ]  oliiic." 

There  were,  no  doubt,  many  who  never  employed 
their  minds  in  reflecting,  but  took  those  gods  as  exam- 
ples. And  as  were  their  gods,  so  were  they.  And  let 
any  one  carefully  observe  the  Indian,  or  any  other 
heathen  nation,  and  I  apprehend,  he  will  be  convinced 
that  their  moral  notions  exactly  correspond  with  their 
ideas  of  the  will  of  the  Great  Spirit  or  Deity. 

But  it  is  said,  that  we  have  a  constitutional  moral 
sense  from  which  we  derive  our  notions  of  right  and 
wrong.  Now,  if  our  minds  be  thus  constituted,  we  can 
detect  moral  right  and  wrong  by  an  appeal  to  this  in- 
ternal sense.  For  instance,  to  ouj  constitutions  we 
appeal  to  ascertain  whether  an  apple  be  sour  or  sweet, 


28 


Ethica. 


Right  and  Wrong. 


29 


and  our  organs  of  taste  arc  so  constituted  as  to  give 
us  the  ideas  of  these  qualities.  And  to  another  part  of 
our  constitution  we  appeal  for  our  idea  of  black  and 
white.  Let  us,  then,  make  this  appeal  to  our  consti- 
tutions for  the  ideas  of  moral  right  and  wrong.  To 
worship  idols  made  by  hands,  is  wrong,  says  the 
Christian.  These  are  ourgods,  and  it  is  right  to  pros- 
trate ourselves  before  them,  say  the  Hindoos.  And 
we  need  not  adduce  and  multiply  examples  to  show 
the  contrariety  of  opinion  in  regard  to  what  action  is 
right  and  what  wrong  ;  for  the  examples  are  as  num- 
erous as  the  actions  which  involve  the  question  of 
moral  right  and  wrong.  And  hence  it  is  evident,  that 
difTerent  individuals  attribute  opposite  moral  qualities 
to  the  same  object.  Suppose  now,  we  present  an  ob- 
ject for  different  individuals  to  determine  the  color. 
The  first  says,  it  is  black  ;  the  second,  it  is  white  ;  the 
third,  it  is  red  ;  and  the  fourth,  it  is  green.  Now  the 
object  must  either  be  a  chameleon,  or  these  persons 
must  have  differently  constituted  organizations.  It 
may  be  said,  that  these  persons  must  have  had  previous 
ideas  of  black,  green,  &c.,  or  they  could  not  have  pre- 
dicated either  of  the  qualities  of  the  object.  But  black 
and  green  are  recognized  because  we  are  constituted 
to  perceive  them  by  the  sense  of  sight.  And  we  see 
black  the  first  time  an  object  possessing  it  is  presented 
to  our  eyes.  And  having  given  this  quality  a  name, 
we  affirm  it  of  other  objects,  which  we  perceive  to  pos- 
sess it. 


And  it  is  to  be  observed,  that  through  all  our  con- 
stitutional senses  we  derive  the  knowledge  of  the  ex- 
istence of  any  quality,  from  some  object  in  which  this 
quality  is  inherent.    Thus,  were  not  some  object  pos- 
sessing inherent  sweetness  presented  to  our  taste,  we 
would  never  know  that  such  a  quality  was  in  existence. 
And  there  may  be  many  qualities  in  an  object  of  which 
we  know  nothing,  because  we  have  no  sense  to  make 
us  acquainted  with  them.    But  when  an  object  posses- 
sing a  certain  quality   is  presented  for  the  first  time 
to  the  appropriate  sense,  we  then,  for  the  first  time, 
perceive  that  there  is  such  a  quality  in  existence.     If 
then,  we  obtain  the  knowledge  of  moral  right  through 
a  constitutional  sense,  some  actions,  in  which  this  qual- 
ity is  inherent,  must  be  presented  to  this  sense  or  we 
could  never  know  that  right  existed.    Now,  if  we  ad- 
.  mit,  that  there  are  a  few  actions  which  all  mankind 
acknowledge  to  be'right,  i.  e.,  to  have  this  quality  in- 
herent in  them,  and,  that  from  these  actions  men  de- 
rive the  notion  of  moral  right  ;  the  moral  sense  hypo- 
thesis will  still  fail  to  account  for  the  difference  of 
opinion  respecting  other  actions .     Suppose  each  of  six 
men  to  taste  of  each  of  six  apples,  and  they  all  agree 
that  all  of  these  apples  have  the  same  taste,  i.  e.  pos- 
sess a  certain  quality,  to  which  quality  they  give  the 
name  of  sweet.     Suppose  also,  they  all  taste  of  six 
other  apples,  and  agree  that  these  all  possess  a  certain 
quality  very  different  from  the  first,  to  which  quality 
they  give  the  name  of  sour.  Now  if  these  men's  consti- 


30 


Ethica. 


Right  and  Wrong. 


31 


tutions  be  alike  when  they  use  the  term  sweet,  they 
will  all  have  the  same  notion  of  the  quality  spoken  of. 

And  so  also  of  sour. 

Suppose  now,  six  other  apples  be  introduced.     Two 
of  the  men  say  they  are  sweet ;  two  say,  they  are 
sour  ;  and  two  say,  they  possess  neither  of  these  qual- 
ities.'  Here  indeed,  is  a  miracle.     For  if  these  men's 
constitutions  be  in  every  respect  alike,  this  difference 
of  opinion  cannot  exist.     But  again,  suppose  a  certain 
number  of  men  to  possess  all  the  senses  which  belong 
to  human  nature,  yet  it  is  evident,  that  the  same 
sense,  in  different  individuals,  differs  in  activity  and 
acute'ness  ;  and  different  individuals  differ  widely  in 
the  discriminating  power  of  each  sense.    Thus,  some 
can  discriminate  colors  more  correctly  than  others  ; 
while  others  can  detect  differences  iu  objects  of  touch 
which  the  former  do  not  perceive.     And  perhaps  two 
persons  cannot  he  found  in  whom  the  same  sense  is 
equally  susceptible,  active  and  acute.     Will  this,  on 
the  moral  sense  hypothesis,  account  for   the  differ- 
ence of  opinion  respecting  moral  right  and  wrong  ? 

Suppose  two  men  undertake  to  point  out  the  objects 
which  possess  the  quality  of  black.  One  of  the  men 
possesses  a  susceptible  and  discriminating  sense  of  col- 
ors •  while  the  other's  is  unpracticed  and  obtuse. 
Now,  if  both  of  these  men  have  an  idea  of  the  quality 
of  black,  i.  e.  mean  the  same  thing  by  this  term,  then 
it  is  evident,  that  some  object  possessing  this  quality 
in  a  sufficiently  apparent  degree,  must  have  been  pre- 


sented  to  the  sense  of  the  dull  man  ;  otherwise  he 
could  not  have  known  that  there  was  such  a  quality 
in  existence.    And  it  is  obvious  that  where  this  quali- 
ty was  sufficiently  apparent  to  be  perceived  by  the 
man  of  obtuse  sense,  it  would  more  readily  be  perceiv- 
ed by  the  man  of  acute  sense.     And  so  of  other  quali- 
ties.   Hence,  no  difference  of  opinion  could  exist  so 
long  as  the  quality  was  sufficiently  apparent  to   be 
perceived  by  the  one  whose  sense  is  obtuse.      And  I 
think  it  will  be  admitted,  that  two  opposite  qualities 
cannot  exist  in  the  same  object  at  the  same  time  ;  and 
that  when  a  man  mistakes  one  quality  for  another, 
there  must  be  a  sufficient  resemblance  between  the  two 
to  cause  this  mistake.     But  two  opposite  qualities 
which  are  perceived  by  the  same  sense  cannot  be  made 
to  resemble  each  other.    Thus,  two  objects  may  pos- 
sess qualities  of  color  so  nearly  -resembling  each  other 
as  to  be  mistaken  for  the  same,  while  their  qualities  of 
taste  may  be  opposite.    But  sour  cannot  be  made  to 
resemble  sweet.    For  as  soon  as  it  begins  to  become 
less  unlike  sweet,  it  begins  to  cease  to  be  the  same 
original  quality.      Therefore  one  quality  cannot  be 
mistaken  for  its  opposite,  on  account  of  the  resem- 
blance between  the  two. 

To  return,  then,  to  our  acute  and  obtuse  sense  men. 

When  a  quality  was  not  sufficiently  apparent  to  be 

perceived  by  the  man  of  obtuse  sense,  it  would  be  gone 

from  the  object,  for  aught  he  would  know  ;  but  it 

could  not  resemble  an  opposite  quality  so  that  the 


i 

> 


Moral  Right  and  Wrong. 


33 


32 


Ethica. 


man  might  mistake  this  resemblance  for  the  opposite 
quality  itself.  Thus,  a  piece  of  goods  may  possess  the 
quality  of  black  in  such  a  degree  that  an  unpractised 
man  may  be  unable  to  determine  whether  it  be  blackr 
or  some  other  color  which  nearly  resembles  black. 
But  so  long  as  black  is  inherent  in  the  goods,  no  man 
will  mistake  it  for  white,  the  opposite  quality.  And 
hence,  [  think  the  moral  sense  liypothesis  entirely  fails 
to  account  for  the  phenomena. 


/ 


CHAPTER    V. 

TO   WHAT,   IN    HUMAN    ACTIONS,    MORAL    RIGHT   AND 

WRONG    ATTACH. 

In  Chapter  third,  we  considered  human  actions  with 
reference  to  the  mind  of  the  actor,  and  with  reference 
to  the  objects  upon  which  they  are  produced.  Let  u& 
now  examine  them  in  order  to  see,  to  what  and  in 
what  manner  moral  right  and  wrong  attach.  Let  u& 
commence  with  that  division  with  reference  to  tlie 
mind  of  the  actor.  Of  these  the  first  class  is  inten- 
tional actions.  We  have  shown  the  manner  by  which 
they  are  brought  about,  to  be,  by  a  conception  of  the 
proposed  action ;  by  the  determination  of  the  will^ 
and  by  the  intention,  which  consists  in  adopting  those 


antecedents  which  will  produce  the  desired  consequent, 
i.  e.,  by  the  adapting  means  to  accomplish  an  end. 
Hence  there  are  four  things  to  be  considered  in  every 
intentional  action,  viz  :  the  conception,  the  determi- 
nation of  the  will,  the  intention,  and  the  effect  pro- 
duced, L  €.,  the  action  itself. 

Now,  to  the  conception  of  an  action,  I  apprehend, 
moral  right  and  wrong  do  not  attach.  For,  if  they 
do,  then  a  person  cannot  read  intelligently  any  book 
which  speaks  of  wrong  actions,  or  be  accidentally 
witness  to  any  evil,  without  participating  in  crime. 
And  the  mere  conception  of  a  right  action  would  con- 
fer merit  on  an  individual. 

Of  the  determination  of  the  will.— Let  us  suppose 
a  certain  action  to  have  no  moral  quality  whatever  ; 
there  then  could  certainly  be  no  moral  quality  attach- 
ed to  the  determination  of  the  will  to  do,  or  to  refrain 
from  it.  For,  the  will  is  a  faculty  of  the  mind,  which 
the  Deity  has  created.  The  determination  of  the 
will  is  an  exertion  of  this  faculty.  Now,  there  can  be 
wrong  in  the  exertion  of  any  faculty  only  when  this 
exertion  is  put  forth  in  a  wrong  direction.  The  wrong 
then  lies  in  the  direction,  and  not  in  the  mere  exertion 
itself.  Hence,  moral  right  or  wrong  attaches  to  the 
determination  of  the  will,  as  this  determination  makes 
to  accomplish  a  morally  right  or  wrong  action. 

Of  the  intention.— We  have  already  stated,  that  by 
intention,  we  mean,  the  adapting  means  to  accomplish 
an  end.    Let  us  now  enquire  further  into  it.    Take 


]\ 


34 


Ethica. 


an  example  of  an  action  upon  matter.  Suppose  a  man 
desire  conveniently  to  obtain  water  from  a  well.  He 
first  cuts  down  a  tree  ;  then  bores  it ;  then  fixes  a  sta- 
tionary valve  in  it ;  then  attaches  a  valve  to  a  pump- 
rod,  and  joins  this  to  a  handle,  which  he  places  in  the 
top  of  the  pump ;  he  then  puts  the  pump  thus  com- 
pleted into  the  well ;  and  then  pumps  and  receives  the 
water.  Now,  if  we  examine  this  chain  of  actions,  we 
will  perceive,  that  each  step  in  itself  is  a  complete 
action  ;  and  that  each  preceding  action  is  a  necessary 
antecedent  to  the  next  succeeding  one,  i.  e.,  each  step 
is  a  mean  adapted  to  accomplish  the  next  step.  Each 
of  these  steps  the  judgment  determined  the  will  to 
adopt,  as  a  proper  antecedent  to  accomplish  the  end, 
which  the  will  had  first  determined  upon.  Intention 
in  the  mind,  therefore,  is  the  determining  the  will  by 
the  judgment. 

Tracing  the  intention,  then,  we  will  find,  that  the 
man  cut  the  tree  with  the  intention  of  boring  it,  L  e.y 
the  cutting  the  tree  the  judgment  determined  the  will 
to  adopt  as  an  antecedent  to  accomplish  the  boring  ; 
he  bored  it  with  the  intention  of  fixing  valves  and  a 
rod  in  it ;  he  placed  the  whole  pump  into  the  well 
with  the  intention  of  pumping ;  and  he  pumped  with 
the  intention  of  obtaining  water. 

In  like  manner,  intention  may  be  traced  from  the 
first  determination  of  the  will  to  accomplish  an  end 
to  all  intentional  actions.  And  it  obviously  enters 
into  all  the  actions  anterior  to  the  ultimate  one,  but 


Moral  Right  and  Wrong. 


35 


into  this  it  does  not  enter.    And  we  must  observe, 
that,  intention  frequently  enters  into  several  actions 
beyond  the  last  one,  which  we  perceive.    Thus  :  If  a 
man  take  a  rifle,  shoot  an  individual  and  rob  him  of 
his  money,  we  can  perceive  intention  in  taking  the 
rifle  and  in  shooting  the  individual ;  these  are  antece- 
dents to  the  robbery.   But  we  can  trace  it  no  further ; 
for,  we  cannot  tell  with  what  intention  the  man  took 
the  money,  I  e.,  what  consequent  would  be  made  to 
follow  this  antecedent.    But  no  doubt,  intention  did 
enter  into  this  action,  L  c,  the  judgment  determined 
the  will  to  use  this  antecedent  to  procure  a  conse- 
quent.   Perhaps,  the  man  took  the  money,  designing 
it  as  an  antecedent  to  obtaining  fine  clothes  ;  and 
perhaps, he  procured  these  to  gratify  pride.   Intention, 
however,  always  stops  in  the  action  which  immediately 
precedes  the  ultimate  effect,  which  the  actor  has  in 
view.    And  in  intentional  actions,  as  intention,  L  e., 
the  adapting  means  to  accomplish  an  end,  stands  be- 
tween the  first  determination  of  the  will  and  the  pro- 
posed action,  it  is  always  mentally  and  physically 
right,  1.  c,  the  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  things,  and 
the  proper  antecedents  have  been  possessed  and  used. 
Now,  in  no  other  sense  than  the  one  we  have  given, 
can  intention  enter,  in  any  manner,  into  any  action 
whatever.* 


«  We  frequently  use  the  verb  intend,  the  noun  inieniim,  the  adjec- 
tive inteniumal,  and  the  adverb  intentUmaUy,  to  express  the  determi- 
nation of  the  will.     As,  "I  inUnd  to  live  in  town  next  winter;" 


m 


36 


Ethica. 


Moral  Right  and  Wrong. 


37 


And  to  the  operation  of  mind  of  determining  tlie 
will  by  the  judgment,  which  operation  constitutes  in- 
tention in  the  mind,  moral  right  or  wrong  can  attach 
only  as  this  operation  makes  to  accomplish  a  morally 
right  or  wrong  action.    Suppose  a  doctor  to  be  called 
to  visit  a  sick  man,  and  from  some  reason  or  other,  he 
should  administer  medicine  with  the  intention  of  killing 
the  patient,  but  from  a  misapprehension  of  the  qual- 
ities of  the  drugs,  he  should  give  just  such  things  as 
would  restore  the  man  to  health.     Here,  I  apprehend, 
every  man  would  say,  that  the  doctor's  determination 
was  wrong,  and  that  the  intention  of  the  doctor,  i.  e., 
the  adapting  means  to  accomplish  this  end,  was  wrong 
also,  and  because  it  made  to  accomplish  a  wrong 
action.    We  will  perceive,  that  here  the  effect  produ- 
ced is  an  accidental  one,  and  that  in  the  intention 
there  are  mental  and  physical  wrongs,  i.  e.,  the  willful 
end  did  not  follow  the  antecedents  used,  while  the 
guilt  charged  to  the  doctor's  character  results  from 
the  attachment  of  moral  wrong  to  the  determination 
of  the  will  and  to  the  endeavor  to  carry  this  deter- 
mination into  execution,  L  e.,  to  the  intention.* 


"  He  did  it  intentionally:'  ♦'  It  is  my  intention  to  visit  the  Lake,"  etc. 
We  have  spoken  of  the  determination  of  the  will,  and  this  mean- 
ing must  not  be  confounded  with  the  meanmg  given  to  intention  in 
the  text. 

«  Dr.  Wayland  tells  us  that  the  moml  quality  of  actions  resides 
in  the  intention,  and  gives  the  following  example  to  show  it : 

•*  A.  and  B.  both  give  to  C.  a  piece  of  money.     They  both  con- 
ceived of  this  action  before  they  performed  it.    lliey  both  resolved 


Let  us  next  examine  accidental  actions.— In  acciden- 
tal actions,  moral  right  or  wrong  cannot,  in  any  man- 

to  do  precisely  what  they  did.  In  all  this  both  actions  coincide. 
A  however  gave  it  to  C.  with  the  intention  of  procurmg  the  mur- 
der of  a  friend  ;  B.  with  the  intention  of  relieving  a  family^  m 
distress.  It  is  evident  that  in  this  the  intention  gives  to  the  action 
its  character  of  right  or  wrong." 

It  will  be  perceived  upon  reflection  that,  in  this  example  given  by 
Dr.  Wayland,  the  physical  actions,  i.  e.,the  placing  the  pieces  of 
money  in  the  hands  of  C,  were  designed  as  antecedents  to  two 
actions  of  opposite  character  upon  mind,  viz :  the  influencing  the 
mind  of  C.  to  murder  and  to  benevolence.     It  will  be  further  per- 
ceived that,  these  antecedents  in  themselves  could  never  have  pro- 
duced the  effects  designed  upon  the  mind  of  C,  unless  other  antece- 
dents had  been   used  in   connexion  with  them,  viz:   language  or 
signs.     And  had  these  other  antecedents  not  been  used,  no  further 
action  corresponding  to  those  determined  by  the  will  of  A.  and  B. 
could  have  been  produced  by  C,  except  by  coincidence.     And  had 
the  affair  stopped  with  placing  the  pieces  of  money  in  the  hands  of 
C,  all  that  could  have  occurred,  would  have  been  the  attachment 
of  moral  right  and  wrong  to  the  determinations  of  the  will  of  A.  and 
B.  respectivdy.     If,  however,  any  action  corresponding  to  those 
determined  by  A.  and  B.  succeeded  intentionally,  i.  e.,  by  the  inten- 
tion of  A.  or  B.,  the  receiving  money  by  C,  it  followed  by  reason 
of   this  other  antecedent's    connection  with    the    bestowing  the 
money.    And  to  these  other  antecedents,  i.  e.,  the  advising  to  mur- 
der and  to  benevolence,  moral  right  and  wrong  respectively  attach. 
For,  they  are  in  themselves,  right  and  wrong  respectively.    And  it 
may  be  further  remarked  that,  considering  the  connection  of  these 
other  antecedents  with  the  bestowing  the  money,  A.  and  B. 'sections 
thus  far,  do  not  coincide  at  all,  but  are  opposite  in  their  chaiacter. 

The  fallacy  of  this  doctrine  of  Wayland,  however,  will  be,  per- 
haps, more  easily  perceived  by  adopting  the  redudio  ad  ahsurdum. 
Human  actions  are  either  right  or  wrong  in  themselves,  or  they  be- 
come so  from  the  intention  of  the  actor.  Let  us,  therefore,  admit 
that,  human  actions  receive  their  moral  qualities  from  the  intention 
of  the  actor,  and  that  in  themselves  they  possess  no  moral  quality. 


38 


Ethic  A. 


Moral  Right  and  Wrong. 


39 


ner,  attach  to  the  determination  of  the  will.  For  the 
will  never  determined  to  produce  them.  Neither  can 
anything  be  affirmed  of  the  conception  ;  because  the 
identical  eflfect  was  not  conceived  of  before  it  took 
place.  Nor  can  any  moral  quality  be  attached  to  the 
intention.  For,  the  intention  to  produce  the  actual 
effect,  did  not  enter  into  any  of  the  antecedents  to  the 
consequent  action. 

Let  U3  next  consider  experimental  actions.  In  these 
the  determination  of  the  will,  the  intention,  and  the 
conception,  all  have  reference  to  the  intentional  ac- 
tions, which  immediately  precede  them.  And  inten- 
tional actions,  we  have  already  considered.  We  need 
not,  therefore,  examine  experimental  actions  with 
reference  to  the  mind  of  the  actor. 

Let  us  next  examine  actions  with  reference  to  the 
objects  upon  which  they  are  produced.  Suppose  a 
person  should  produce  the  same  effect  upon  a  man  and 

Wherever  the  intention  be  morally  right,  then  the  action,  into  which 
this  intention  enters,  must  be  right  also,  and  vice  versa.  Those  persons, 
therefore,  who  sacrifice  hmnan  victims  to  please  the  Almighty,  per- 
form morally  right  actions.  For,  we  will  all  admit,  that  to  endeavor 
to  please  God  is  right.  But  it  may  be  said,  that  human  sacrifice 
does  not  please  the  Creator,  but  incurs  his  displeasure.  Wh  it  of 
that !  If  men  from  an  error  of  judgment  believe,  that  human  sac- 
rifice will  please  the  Deity,  and  do  it  with  this  intention,  t.  c,  adopt 
this  means  to  accomplish  that  end,  the  intention,  though  mentally 
wrong,  producing  an  accidental  instead  or  the  effect  aimed  at,  is  yet 
morally  right,  because  it  endeavors  to  do  right,  and  in  this  intention 
resides  the  moral  quality  of  the  action,  which  is  therefore  morally 
right  also. 


upon  a  sheep.     And  suppose  this  effect  to  be  death. 
I  apprehend,  men  would  say,  that  this  same  effect,  in 
the  one  case,  was  wrong,  and  in  the  other  not.    And 
if  we  inquire  why  it  is  thus,  I  apprehend  they  will 
tell  us,  that  it  is  wrong  to  produce  death  upon  a  man, 
though  it  be  not  so  to  kill  a  sheep.    And  this  is  the 
same  thing  as  saying  that,  it  is  morally  wrong  to  pro- 
duce a  given  effect  upon  certain  objects,  while  it  is  not 
so  to  produce  the  same  effect  upon  others.    And  this 
doctrine,  I  apprehend,  is  sound  philosophy.    But  if  it 
be  said,  that  men,  who  hold  it  to  be  morally  wrong  to 
take  the  life  of  an  innocent  man,  nevertheless  in  cases 
of  hydrophobia,  and  in  war,  do  not  consider  it  wrong 
to  kill  men,  it  only  confirms  our  position,  that  it  is 
morally  wrong  to  produce  a  given  effect  upon  some 
objects,  and  not  upon  others.    For,  in  hydrophobia, 
and  in  an  unjust  war,  men  are  different  objects  from 
what  they  are  when  free  from  hydrophobia  and  not 
inflicting  wrong.   The  sum  of  the  matter  is,  that  those 
human  actions  which  are  consistent  with  the  will  of 
the  Creator,  are  morally  right  per  se,  and  those  con- 
trary to  His  will  are  morally  wrong  _2^er  se.    And  it 
matters  not,  whether  the  actions  be  intentional,  acci- 
dental or  experimental,  so  far  as  relates  to  the  actions, 
though  intentional  actions  are  the  only  ones  which 
affect  the  character  of  the  actor,  as  we  shall  see  by 
and  by. 


40 


Ethica. 


CHAPTER    VI. 


CONSCIENCE. 


We  have  seen  in  Chapter  IV.  that,  right  and  wrong 
depend  upon  the  laws  which  the  Creator  has  establish- 
ed, i.  6.,  upon  the  will  of  Deity.  And  as  in  a  State 
without  a  supreme  power  to  prescribe  laws,  there 
would  be  no  municipal  law,  and  consequently,  no  legal 
right  or  wrong,  so,  without  a  moral  law-giver,  there 
would  be  no  moral  law,  and  consequently  no  moral 
right  or  wrong.  And  as  moral  right  and  wrong  de- 
pend upon  the  will  of  Deity,  every  human  action  in 
itself  must  be  either  right  or  wrong.  For,  if  we  say 
that,  there  are  some  actions,  of  which  the  commission 
or  omission  is  no  violation  of  moral  law,  these  actions, 
as  they  do  not  violate  moral  law,  must  be  consistent 
with  the  will  of  Deity.  The  omission  of  them,  how- 
ever, cannot  be  wrong.  Thus  :  If  a  resident  of  Phil- 
adelphia, who  has  no  obligation  to  keep  him  at  home, 
go  to  New-York,  or  stay  at  home,  he  has  done  no 
wrong  in  either  case.  Neither,  if  a  person  walking 
along  the  banks  of  the  Schuylkill,  should  pick  up  a 
stone  and  throw  it  into  the  water,  or  omit  to  throw  it 
in,  would  he  have  done  any  wrong.  There  is,  how- 
ever, another  class  of  actions,  the  omitting  to  perform 
which  is  morally  wrong.    For,  the  will  of  Deity  makes 


■-•i*sif;9&'»- 


Conscience. 


41 


them  obligatory.  Now,  all  men  will  admit  that,  there 
is  something  meant  by  the  term  conscience.  And  all 
men  will  agree  that,  conscience  has  a  relation,  in  some 
manner,  to  moral  right  and  wrong,  and  to  nothing 
else.  Some  authors  suppose  conscience  to  be  a  faculty 
of  the  mind,  which,  independently  of  the  reflective 
faculties,  and  independently  of  all  previous  ideas, 
teaches  men  what  actions  are  morally  right  or  wrong. 

We  believe  there  is  no  such  faculty,  sense,  or  in- 
stinct, in  the  human  mind;  but  that,  the  ideas  of 
moral  right  and  wrong  are  obtained  in  the  manner 
stated  in  Chapter  TV. 

Now,  there  are  six  states  of  mind,  which,  I  appre- 
hend, are  comprehended  by  the  term  conscience.— 

1st.  Moral  approval  and  disapproval. 

2d.   Moral  impulsion  and  repulsion. 

3d.  Moral  satisfaction  and  remorse. 

Now,  moral  approval  and  disapproval  must  follow 
after  intellections.  For,  if  a  man  approve  of  any 
action,  on  any  other  ground  than  moral  right,  then  it 
is  not  a  moral  approval.  But  if  he  approve  of  an 
action  because,  he  believes  it  to  be  morally  right,  then 
moral  right  is  in  his  mind.  And  it  is  impossible  to 
morally  approve  or  disapprove  of  any  action,  without, 
first,  having  ideas  of  moral  right  and  wrong.  If  then, 
ideas  of  moral  right  and  wrong  always  precede  these 
states  of  mind,  and  if  these  states  cannot  exist  without 
them,  then,  it  must  be  evident  that,  these  ideas  cause 
moral  approval  and  disapproval,  t.  e.,  moral  approval 

5 


Ill 


42 


Ethica. 


Conscience. 


43 


and  disapproval  are  the  effects  which  follow  the  im- 
pressions of  moral  right  or  wrong  upon  t^e  m^ind. 

And  I  apprehend,  authors  have  confounded  moral 
approval  with  others  of  a  very  different  character. 
Kse  a  man  to  snatch  a  child  from  its  mother's 
arms,  and  throw  it  under  the  cylinder  of  a  threshing 
niachine.     Would  not  the  mother  become  frantic? 
Would  not  her  feelings  greatly  disapprove  of  the 
action  ?    Yet.  I  apprehend,  she  would  not  at  the  time 
consider  whether  the  action  were  morally  right  or 
ZL'T.    Neither  would  she  immediately,  morally  dis- 
appro'Ve  of  it.    Maternal  affection  is  not  conscience. 
ILm  ■  if  we  should  be  looking  at  three  men  trying 
To  lift  a  bar  of  iron  without  being  able,  ^d  another 
man  should  pick  up  the  bar  and  walk  off  with  it.  we 
would  all  j)in  in  the  applause. 

Yet  conscience  would  have  nothing  at  all  to  do  with 
our  approbation.  And  there  are  thousands  of  actions^ 
oJwUch  we  approve  or  disapprove,  where  the  appro- 
bation or  disapprobation  flows  from  a  part  of  our 

constitution  very  ^^-*  ^f^  ^iX  besmets 
will  have  much  to  do  with  it.     ine  ^""' 
Hs  face  and  puts  rings  in  his  nose,  and  thinks  it  he- 
cling  to  do  so  ;  while  persons  of  refinement  disap- 
prove of  these  actions.  _ 

Next-  we  are  impelled  by  conscience  to  do  those 
actions  'the  omission  of  which  we  believe  to  be  wrong, 
and  repelled  from  those  which  we  believe  to  be  wrong 
S  tlSSves.    And  these  states  of  mind  are  evident- 


ly  caused  by  the  ideas  of  moral  right  and  wrong,  t.  e., 
they  are  the  effects  which  follow  the  impression  of 
these  ideas  upon  the  mind.  Hence,  ideas  of  moral 
right  and  wrong  produce  feelings  of  moral  obligation. 
And  as  moral  right  and  wrong  depend  upon  the  will 
of  Deity,  if  we  mistake  this  will,  conscience  will  im- 
pel us  towards  a  wrong  action,  with  the  same  force  as 
though  the  action  were  really  right,  and  vice  versa. 
The  same  thing  is  observable  in  other  cases.  If  a  man 
mistake  the  moonlight  shadow  of  a  bush  for  a  wild 
beast,  he  will  be  impelled  to  run  with  the  same  force, 
as  though  there  were  really  a  lion  in  the  way.  And 
of  so  great  force  are  the  feelings  of  moral  obligation 
that,  where  a  person  firmly  believes  a  certain  course  to 
be  morally  right,  and  an  opposite  course  to  be  morally 
wrong,  he  must  pursue  the  former  at  all  hazards,  or 
become  miserable.  Where  the  belief  is  firm,  feelings 
of  moral  obligation  will  be  obeyed.  And  hence,  the 
phenomena  of  men  dying  at  the  stake  rather  than  to 
renounce  the  tenets  of  true  or  false  religions,  are 
easily  accounted  for.  Feelings  of  moral  obligation, 
however,  do  not  affect  all  men  thus  strongly.  The 
ideas  of  moral  right  and  wrong  are  but  little  attended 
to,  and  consequently  make  but  little  impression  upon 
some  minds.  And  these  men  make  some  other  than 
moral  principle,  their  rule  of  action. 

But,  I  apprehend,  authors  have  also  confounded 
moral  impulsion  and  repulsion,  with  other  feelings. 
We  are  told  that,  when  we  feel  we  ought  to  do  so  and 


-i,>t!>i(fi%<(»<3at 


4^i>tnt^lGl-m' 


44 


Ethica. 


Conscience. 


45 


80,  this  feeling  is  the  moral  impulse.    If  I  tinderstand 
the  meaning  of  feeling  that,  we  ought  to  act  thus  and 
so,  it  is,  that  we  are  impelled  to  a  certain  course.  The 
impulse  may  be  moral  obligation,  self-love,  maternal 
affection,  or  any  other.    It  is  the  moral  impulse  only, 
when  we  believe  it  to  be  morally  right  to  do  so,  and 
to  omit  to  do  so  to  be  morally  wrong.    Any  person  of 
tender  sensibility  would  be  repelled  from  an  ugly 
worm.     But  who  would  suppose  this  feeling  to  be 
moral  repulsion  ?    Now,  when  we  feel  that,  we  ought 
to  do  an  action,  because  we  believe  it  to  be  morally 
right,  and  the  omission  of  it  to  be  morally  wrong,  we 
are  then  impelled  by  moral  obligation,  and  we  are 
then  acting  under  the  noblest  impulse  of  our  nature. 
For,  as  moral  right  depends  upon  the  will  of  God, 
when  we  perceive  his  will,  and  are  impelled  by  our 
moral  feelings  to  fulfill  it,  all  things  else  to  the  con- 
trary, here  is  "  action,  godlike  action." 

Next,  of  moral  satisfaction  and  remorse.— These  are 
states  of  mind,  which  occur  after  we  have  accomplish- 
ed an  action.  They  are  evidently  produced  by  the 
ideas  of  moral  right  and  wrong  together  with  the  con- 
sciousness of  having  fulfilled  or  violated  moral  obliga- 
tion.  Every  person  can  make  himself  conscious  of 
the  fact  that,  if  he  believe  an  action  to  be  morally 
right,  and  feel  under  moral  obligation  to  accomplish 
.  it,  he  will  feel,  after  its  accomplishment,  a  moral  sat- 
isfaction with  himself,— a  noble  elevation  of  mind. 
I  presume  most  men  have  experienced  this  state  of 


mind.  And  on  the  other  hand,  if  happily  we  have 
not  experienced  remorse,  we  have  but  too  many  exam- 
ples of  intelligent  men,  who  having  passed  most  of 
their  lives  in  immoral  practices,  have  at  the  close  of 
life  experienced  all  the  bitterness,  which  this  painful 
state  of  mind  produces. 

Now,  that  the  states  of  mind  above  spoken  of  do 
occur,  I  think  no  one  can  doubt.  And  I  think  it  is  evi- 
dent, they  are  brought  up  in  the  manner  stated.  Ideas 
of  moral  right  and  wrong  produce  moral  approval  and 
disapproval ;  after  these  follows  moral  obligation,  t.  £., 
moral  impulsion  and  repulsion  ;  we  then  act  or  refrain 
from  acting ;  then  comes  moral  satisfaction  or  re- 
morse. And  these  states  of  mind,  I  apprehend,  maka 
up  what  we  call  conscience. 

But  if  it  be  asked  why  these  states  of  mind  occur 
in  the  manner  above  stated,  we  may  also  ask  why 
ideas  of  danger  produce  fear  ?  or  why  certain  objects 
produce  love  and  others  aversion.  The  only  answer 
which  can  be  given  to  these  questions,  is  that,  the 
Creatoi-  has  made  our  constitutions  such  that,  they 
are  acted  upon  in  this  manner. 

Now,  from  what  has  been  said  it  must  be  evident 
that  these  states  of  mind  may  interchange.  If  we 
once  believed  an  action  to  be  wrong,  and  felt  under 
moral  obligation  to  refrain  from  it,  but  our  intellec- 
tions have  since  changed  our  belief  respecting*  it,  we 
may  now  have  a  moral  approval  and  feel  under  moral 
obligation  to  perform  it,  and  vice  versa.    And  it  may 


■  m.'^O'^'^: 


•.  Tt^«Mr 


46 


Ethica. 


be  further  observed  that,  we  may  morally  approve  or 
disapprove  of  other  men's  actions  ;  but  moral  obliga- 
tion, and  moral  satisfaction  and  remorse  have  respect 
to  our  own  actions  only. 


CHAPTER    VII. 

SELF-LOVE. 

If  a  farmer  who  had  two  fields,  could  by  the  Culti- 
vation of  one  in  wheat  and  the  other  in  corn,  raise  five 
hundred  bushels  of  wheat  and  a  like  quantity  of  corn, 
but  by  the  cultivation  of  the  former  in  corn  and  the 
latter  in  wheat,  he  could  raise  one  thousand  bushels  of 
each,  and  therefore  he  should  adopt  this  latter  arrange- 
ment, the  impulse  which  influenced  his  mind  to  adopt- 
this  system,  is  called  self-love.    Now,  we  have  said 
that  there  are  many  actions  right  in  themselves,  the 
omitting  to  perform  which  is  not  wrong.    To  choose 
which  of  these  we  shall  perform  and  which  omit,  is  for 
self-love  to  decide.    And  moved  by  this  principle,  con- 
scientious men  apply  their  industry  to  capital  in  that 
manner,  which  they  suppose  will  be  the  most  beneficial 
to  themselves.     On  this  principle  also,  the  honest 
mariner  ploughs  the  deep  ;  the  economist  curtails  his 
expenses,  and  the  emigrant  moves  to  foreign  lands.  In 
a  conscientious  mind,  self-love  is  always  subordinate, 


Self-love. 


47 


holding  sway  only  in  actions  indifferent  to  conscience, 
and  is  in  itself  a  noble  principle.  And  a  man  who 
does  not  act  upon  it,  can  have  no  regard  for  his  own 
happiness.  In  minds  influenced  but  little  by  moral 
feelings,  however,  self-love  becomes  self-interest,  which 
frequently  has  no  respect  for  the  rights  or  feelings  of 
others,  and  which  is  generally  the  parent  of  selfishness 

and  meanness. 

Now  there  are  plainly  many  courses  in  life,  all  of 
which  are  indifferent  to  conscience.  And  it  often  hap- 
pens, that  two  or  more  objects  of  desire  are  presented 
to  the  mind,  while  it  is  possible  to  obtain  only  one  of 
them.  And  were  a  person  destitute  of  self-love,  he 
would  grasp  after  the  object  which  most  excited  his 
desire,  without  respect  to  the  comparative  happiness 
which  might  follow.  And  where  the  enjoyment  of  an 
object  was  not  considered  wrong,  and  consequently 
unchecked  by  conscience,  without  self-love  strong  de- 
sires would  be  unduly  gratified.  And  each  man, 
though  conscientious,  would  follow  after  desire  in  a 
course  of  inutility  and  even  perhaps  of  misery. 

Self-love  regulates  this  tendency  in  the  constitution, 
and  by  impelling  men  to  seek  for  themselves  the  great- 
est amount  of  happiness,  raises  noble  minds  from  a 
state  of  conscientious  misery  to  moral  happiness. 


-•^fH^SUl^t^^-0i:0l09^^f'^i9^^f^tm9^^  - 


48 


Ethica. 


Virtue. 


4^ 


I 


CHAPTEK    VIII. 

VIRTUE. 

If  we  inquire  why  a  man  is  either  virtuous  or  vi- 
cious, I  apprehend  we' will  find,  that  it  must  be  either 
with  reference  to  his  determinations,  his  intentions,  or 
his  actions.  If  these  be  all  morally  right,  the  man 
must  be  virtuous.  If  they  be  all  morally  wrong,  he 
is  undoubtedly  vicious.  It  is  necessary,  therefore,  to 
examine  each  of  these  with  reference  to  the  character 
of  the  actor.  And  first  we  will  examine  them  in  in- 
tentional actions. 

First,  Of  the  determination  of  the  will. —A  man,  who 
resolves  to  do  what  he  believes  to  be  wrong,  mankind 
I  apprehend,  hold  to  be  a  vicious  character.  And  he 
who  determines  to  do  what  he  believes  to  be  morally 
right,  is  considered,  so  far  as  the  determination  of  the 
will  is  concerned,  a  virtuous  character.  To  be  virtu- 
ous, however,  so  far  as  the  determination  of  the  will 
is  concerned,  the  will  must  be  determined  to  do  what 
the  man  believes  to  be  right,  because  he  does  believe 
it  to  be  morally  right,  and  for  no  other  reason.  For 
although  a  man  should  firmly  believe  it  to  be  morally 
right  to  pray  to  God,  and  should  determine  to  do  so, 
not  however  from  his  belief  in  its  moral  right,  but 
merely  because  he  expected  in  this  manner  to  gain  the 


esteem  of  his  fellow  men,  this  man  could  not  be  virtu- 
ous, even  so  far  as  the  determination  of  the  will  is  con- 
cerned. 

The  desire  to  do  what  is  believed  to  be  morally 
right,  because  it  is  believed  to  be  morally  right,  must 
therefore,  always  determine  the  will,  in  order  that  a 
man  may  be  virtuous  with  reference  to  his  determina- 
tions. And  this  desire  is  always  induced  in  the  mind 
by  conscience,  and  can  be  induced  by  nothing  else. 

Second,  Of  the  intention.— We  have  before  explain- 
ed the  meaning  of  intention.  And  I  apprehend  that 
so  far  as  the  intention  is  concerned,  a  person  is  vir- 
tuous or  vicious,  as  the  intention  is  to  produce  these 
actions,  which  the  actor  believes  to  be  morally  right 
or  wrong.  If  a  person  believe  it  to  be  morally  right 
to  kill  his  neighbor  and  make  use  of  poison  to  accom- 
plish this  action,  I  cannot  see  but  that  so  far  as  the  in- 
tention is  concerned,  the  murderer  is  virtuous.  Every 
man  who  acts  upon  moral  principle,  must  do  that 
which  he  honestly  believes  to  be  morally  right.  He 
can  do  nothing  else.  And  hence,  if  a  person  who  acts 
upon  moral  principle  be  vicious,  it  must  be  from  some 
other  cause  than  the  intention. 

Thirds  Of  actions. — We  have  said  that  human  actions 
in  themselves  are  either  right  or  wrong.  Now  if  we 
suppose  a  person  to  accomplish  conscientiously  a  given 
action,  and  we  should  go  to  those  men  who  believe 
this  action  to  be  morally  right,  and  inquire  whether 
the  person   had  acted  virtuously  or  not,  I  apprehend 


lilt 


50 


Ethica. 


Virtue. 


51 


they  would  not  hesitate  for  a  moment  in  answering 
that  he  had.  Neither  do  men  hesitate  in  saying,  that 
others  act  viciously  when  the  latter  conscientiously  do 
those  things  which  the  former  believe  to  be  moral 

crimes. 

And  this  shows  us  the  manner  the  human  mind 
views  the  actions  of  men  with  reference  to  virtue.    A 
man  who  believes  certain  actions  to  be  morally  right 
and  certain  others  to  be  morally  wrong,  considers  all 
men   as  virtuous,  who  conscientiously  determine,  in- 
tend, and  do  the  former,  and  abstain  from  the  latter. 
Moral  right  and  wrong  in  actions,  however,  are  im- 
mutably established  by  the  Deity,  and  the  opinions  of 
men  cannot  affect  them  in  any  manner.    And  respect- 
ing what  actions  are  morally  right  and  what  ones 
wrong,  men  may  be  in  ignorance.    And  this  ignorance 
of  the  will  of  the  Creator  may  be  unavoidable  or  will- 
ful.   Unavoidable  ignorance  is  viewed  with  compas- 
sion by  the  human  mind,  and  from  analogy  we  would 
suppose  this  to  be  the  case  with  the  Creator.    If,  how- 
ever, a  man  do  those  things  which  men  consider  mor- 
ally wrong,  they  do  not  regard  the  man  as  virtuous, 
though' his  ignorance  of  the  moral  wrong  in  his  actions 
be  unavoidable.      On  the  other  hand,  willful  igno- 
rance in  itself  is  regarded  by  all  men  as  wrong  and  of 
itself  it  vitiates  the  character.    Ignorance,  therefore, 
cannot  make  a  person  virtuous  with  reference  to  his 
actions.    Now  as  moral  right  and  wrong  are  immuta- 
bly established  by  the  Creator,  from  what  has  been 


said  respecting  determination,  intention  and  action,  it 
follows  that  that  man  only  is  virtuous  who  knows 
what  actions  are  morally  right,  and  what  ones  are 
obligatory  upon  himself,  and  conscientiously  deter- 
mines, intends,  and  when  in  his  power  does  the  latter, 
and  determines,  intends,  and  does  those  things  only 
which  are  in  themselves  right. 

But  he  who  is  really  virtuous,  possesses  virtue. 
Hence  virtue  in  intentional  actions,  consists  in  the 
knowledge  of  what  actions  are  morally  right,  and  what 
ones  obligatory,  and  in  the  conscientiously  determin- 
ing, intending,  and  doing  only  the  will  of  the  Creator. 
Let  us  next  examine  accidental  actions  with  refer- 
ence to  virtue.  It  will  be  recollected  that  in  accidental 
actions,  the  determination  of  the  will  and  the  intention 
make  towards  an  intentional  action.    We  have  there- 
fore, already  examined  them.    The  intentional  action 
towards  which  they  make,  we  have  also  examined. 
And  as  the  accidental  action  which  is  really  produced 
is  in  no  manner  a  willful  one,   it  cannot  affect  the 
character  of  an  individual.    There  is  but  one  thing, 
therefore,  of  which  we  need  speak.     And  that  is  igno- 
rance of  the  means  employed  to  produce  the  inten- 
tional actions,  by   which  ignorance  the  accidental 
action  is  brought  about.    This  ignorance  also,  may  be 
unavoidable  or  willful.    If  it  be  unavoidable,  I  ap- 
prehend mankind  do  not  consider  the  moral  charac- 
ter of  a  man  to  be  affected  by  it.    If  a  man  should 
endeavor  to  rescue  a  person  from  a  burning  house. 


m 


52 


Ethica. 


Virtue, 


53 


and  should  employ  means  which  to  the  best  of  his 
judgment  were  calculated  to  produce  this  effect,  I 
apprehend  he  would  be  considered  virtuous,  even 
though  the  very  use  of  these  means  should  be  the  cause 
of  not  saving  the  person's  life.  If,  however,  a  person 
undertake  to  produce  an  intentional  effect,  and  the 
knowledge  of  the  means  to  be  employed  be  within  his 
power  and  he  will  not  obtain  it,  this  man  cannot  be 
virtuous.  For  he  does  not  care  what  effect  his  exer- 
tions may  produce,  and  therefore  he  acts  not  at  all 
upon  moral  principle. 

Next  of  experimental  actions. — In  these,  it  will  be 
recollected  that  the  determination  of  the  will  and  the 
intention  make  towards  and  accomplish  an  intentional 
action,  which  is  the  immediate  antecedent  to  the  ex- 
perimental one.  And  as  we  have  examined  intention- 
al actions  throughout,  and  as  an  experimental  action, 
not  being  a  willful  one,  cannot  affect  the  character,  we 
need  not  speak  further  on  this  point. 

And  from  what  has  been  said,  it  will  appear' that  the 
definition  given  of  virtue  in  intentional  actions,  is  the 
same  for  all  actions.  It  may  be  stated  in  other  lan- 
guage thus,  he  who  knows  and  conscientiously  does 
the  will  of  the  Creator  is  virtuous  in  the  eyes  of  God. 
Hence,  virtue  is  the  knowing  and,  as  far  as  in  our 
power,  doing  the  will  of  the  Creator  only,  under  a 
feeling  of  moral  obligation.* 


Now  from  what  has  been  said,  it  will  appear  evident 
upon  slight  reflection,  that  virtue  may  be  progressive. 
A  man  who  resolves  to  do  what  is  right,  may  increase  in 
the  knowledge  of  moral  right  from  childhood  to  ex- 
treme old  age  ;  and  consequently  his  virtue  may  in- 
crease from  day  to  day  throughout  his  whole  life. 

Theologians  may.  perhaps,  show  this  progress  to 
continue  through  the  endless  cycles  of  eternity.  Our 
inquiries  have  reference  only  to  man's  existence  on 
earth.  And  not  only  is  it  the  case  that  an  individual 
may  increase  in  virtue,  but  nations  may  become  more 
virtuous  from  generation  to  generation. 

Virtue  may  also  retrograde  in  individuals  and  in 
nations.  And  whatever  may  be  the  quantity  of  vir- 
tue in  an  individual  or  in  a  nation,  vice  will  always 
be  in  an  inverse  ratio  to  it.  It  may  be  remarked  fut- 
ther,  that  all  our  faculties,  and  all  our  feelings  and  af- 
fections, may  be  improved  or  impaired  by  habit. 
Hence  he  who  would  improve  in  virtue,  should  firmly 
resolve  to  obey  every  moral  law  with  which  he  is  ac- 
quainted ;  and  by  so  doing  he  will  make  his  progress 
in  virtue  easy,  and  shut  the  door  against  vice. 


ness."     If  a  man  were  cast  on  an  uninhabited  island,  he  could  no 
longer  do  good  to  mankind,  and  must  therefore  cease  to  be  virtuous. 

6 


I 


«  Paley  tells  us,  that,  "  Virtue  is  the  doing  good  to  mankind  in 
obedience  to  the  will  of  God,  and  for  the  sake  of  everlasting  happi- 


54 


Ethica. 


CHAP  TEH    IX. 

HUMAN   HAPPINESS. 

Happiness  is  a  term  that  can  appropriately  be  appli- 
ed only  to  animate  beings.  We  cannot  with  any  pro- 
priety say,  that  a  rock  is  either  happy  or  unhappy. 
And  if  we  inquire  why  a  rock  may  not  be  happy  or  un- 
happy, I  apprehend,  we  will  find  it  to  be,  because  the 
rock  is  incapable  of  experiencing  either  pleasure  or 
pain.  Now  this  explanation  of  ilie  inability  of  the 
rock,  will  put  us  on  the  right  road  to  ascertain  in 
what  human  happiness  consists,  in  what  manner  it  is 
brought  about,  in  what  manner  its  degree  varies,  and 
in  what  way  we  may  secure  the  greatest  amount.  For 
happiness  is  undoubtedly  a  consequent  which  invari- 
ably follows  certain  antecedents,  and  is  regulated  by 
fixed  laws.  First  then,  of  what  human  happiness  con- 
sists.— Man  is  composed  of  mind  and  body.  And  what- 
ever may  be  the  essence  of  mind,  we  know  that  the 
body  is  essentially  material.  And  but  for  the  mind, 
man  would  be  in  the  same  condition  respecting  happi- 
ness, as  the  rock.  The  mind,  therefore,  is  the  thing 
that  becomes  happy  or  unhappy.  Now  if  we  inquire 
of  any  man  why  he  is  pursuing  a  certain  object,  I  ap- 
prehend we  will  always  find  that  he  either  expe- 
riences pleasure  in  the  pursuit,  or  he  expects  to  expe- 


\ 


Human  Happiness. 


55 


rience  pleasure  in  the  possession,  i.  e.,  to  be  ultimate- 
ly made  happy.  And  I  apprehend,  that  human  happi- 
ness consists  in  nothing  else  than  in  the  experiencing 
pleasure. 

The  musician  cultivates  music  because  he  experiences 
pleasure  in  the  concord  of  sweet  sounds.  And  his 
happiness,  so  far  as  music  affects  it,  consists  in  this 
pleasure.  The  devout  man  cultivates  religion,  in 
which  he  experiences  pleasure,  and  he  expects  ulti- 
mately to  experience  the  pleasure  of  the  blest  in  para- 
dise. And  from  this  it  follows,  that  all  men  will  not 
derive  their  happiness  from  the  same  objects,  unless 
their  constitutions  be  alike  affected  by  those  objects. 
But  this  is  not  the  case.  One  man  experiences  most 
pleasure  in  literature,  another  in  painting,  another  in 
the  exercise  of  his  physical  faculties,  and  so  on.  But 
in  whatever  walk  or  occupation  in  life  a  man  may  be 
happy,  his  happiness  consists  in  experiencing  pleasure. 
Pain  is  the  opposite  of  pleasure,  and  misery  its  conse- 
quent. It  is,  however,  not  sufficient  for  happiness  that 
a  man  should  be  free  from  pain.  Happiness  is  a  posi- 
tive thing,  and  pleasure  must  be  experienced  or  hap- 
piness cannot  exist.  When  a  person  is  in  a  sound 
sleep,  free  from  dreams,  he  experiences  neither  pleasure 
nor  pain  ;  he  is  neither  happy  nor  unhappy.  This 
part  of  our  existence,  nature  has  reserved  for  herself, 
that  she  may  invigorate  the  faculties  and  apply  her 
healing  hand  to  the  wounds  of  mind  and  body. 

Next,  of  the  manner  in  which  human  happiness  is 


56 


Ethica. 


brought  about. — AVo  have  attributed  liap])iness  to  the 
mind.  It  is,  liowever,  b}-  means  of  the  body  that  the 
mind  becomes  acquainted  with  the  external  world. 
If  we  should  suppose  a  person  to  come  into  life  with- 
out any  sense  of  touch,  taste,  smell,  sight  and  hearing, 
such  a  person  could  not  know  anything  whatever 
about  the  world,  and  could  not  be  happy  or  miserable 
in  it. 

Now,  I  apprehend,  our  constitutions  are  such,  that 
we  experience  a  conscious  pleasure  in  discovering  the 
mere  existence  of  things.  This  may  be  noticed  in  a 
child.  How  pleased  it  is  to  discover  objects  of  which 
before  it  had  no  knowledge.  And  every  chemist  who 
has  discovered  an  elementarv  substance,  or  new  com- 
pound,  can  testify  to  the  same  fact.  And  we  have  all 
heard  what  excess  of  pleasure  Newton  experienced 
when  he  discovered  the  universal  law  of  gravitation; 
and  how  Columbus  was  overwhelmed  with  joy  upon 
his  discovering  America. 

But  our  bodies  not  only  make  us  acquainted  with 
the  existence  of  objects,  but  also  with  their  qualities. 
And  the  qualities  of  objects  affect  the  mind  in  two 
ways.  First,  when  perception  is  preceded  by  sensa- 
tion, we  immediately  experience  pleasure  or  pain  from 
these  qualities.  Thus,  the  perception  of  sweet  in 
honey  is  preceded  by  a  sensation  upon  the  organ  of 
taste,  and  we  immediately  experience  pleasure.  And 
an  object  may  be  taken  into  the  stomach,  whose  qual- 
ities will  produce  sensations  of  pleasure  or  pain,  before 


I 


Human  Happiness. 


57 


we  perceive  those  qualities  to  be  inherent  in  the  ob- 
ject. Second,  when  perception  is  to  be  followed  by 
sensation,  the  qualities  of  objects  awaken  in  the  mind 
desire  or  aversion.  Thus,  we  may  perceive,  by  the 
eye  and  sense  of  smell,  certain  qualities  in  an  apple, 
and  these  perceived  qualities  awaken  in  the  mind  a 
desire  to  apply  them  to  the  palate.  But  desire  may 
also  arise  from  the  perception  of  certain  circumstances, 
relations  or  conditions,  which  we  may  suppose  will 
make  us  happy.  Thus,  one  man  may  desire  a  civil 
office,  another  military  glory,  a  third  intellectual  dis- 
tinction, and  so  on.  Now  the  gratification  of  desire 
is  the  applying  some  perceived  qualities,  circum- 
stances, relations  or  conditions,  to  that  part  of  our 
constitutions,  upon  which  they  will  produce  sensations 
of  pleasure. 

But  again,  we  experience  pleasure  by  the  exercise 
of  our  mental  faculties,  in  comparing  ideas,  in  tracing 
resemblances  and  differences,  in  tracing  dependencies 
and  relations  and  in  contemplating  the  works  of 
creation,  &c.  Hence,  human  happiness  is  brought 
about  by  sensations  upon  our  organs  of  sense,  and  by 
exercising  our  mental  and  corporeal  faculties  upon  sub- 
jects and  objects,  whose  inherent  qualities  produce  plea- 
sure. 

Next  of  the  degree  of  happiness.— This  will  always 
vary  directly  as  the  itensity  of  the  pleasure  experi- 
enced. Thus,  two  persons  may  both  experience  plea- 
sure from  strains  of  music.    In  one,  however,  the  plea- 


58 


Ethica. 


sure  may  be  more  intense,  and  consequently  he  will  de- 
rive a  greater  degree  of  happiness  from  music  than  the 
other.  x\nd  thus  it  is  with  every  source  from  which 
men  derive  happiness. 

Next  of  the  greatest  amount  of  happiness. — In  esti- 
mating the  greatest  amount  of  happiness  which  any 
person  may  enjoy,  we  must  take  time  into  the  account. 
If  a  man  whose  life  was  thirty  years,  should  be  made 
happy  in  the  highest  degree  by  the  use  of  his  eyes  for 
ten  years,  and  then  become  blind,  he  could  not  expe- 
rience as  great  an  amount  of  happiness  from  the  eye, 
as  he  would  have  done  had  his  sight  remained  with 
him  through  life.  And  the  same  may  be  said  of  every 
source  of  happiness.  Hence  a  man  will  enjoy  the 
greatest  amount  of  happiness  from  any  source,  when 
that  source  supplies  him  from  the  cradle  to  the  tomb. 
But  a  person  cannot  enjo}'  the  greatest  amount  of 
happiness  of  which  human  nature  is  capable,  unless 
he  can  draw  from  every  source,  from  which  a  man 
with  perfect  faculties  may  derive  happiness.  A  deaf 
man,  whose  life  should  be  just  as  long  as  another's 
who  had  all  his  faculties  perfect,  could  not  enjoy  as 
great  an  amount  of  happiness  as  the  other. 

For  the  latter  has  one  more  source  than  the  former 
from  which  to  derive  happiness.  Now  every  part  of 
mind  and  body  is  a  source  of  happiness.  And  if  an 
individual  would  secure  to  himself  the  greatest  amount 
of  happiness  of  which  his  being  is  capable,  he  must 
watch  over  all  the  springs  of  happiness,  and  see  that 
none  be  dried  up  by  ignorance  or  folly. 


mm 


msm 


Human  Happiness. 


50 


We  may  remark  further,  that  when  we  experience 
pain,  we  are  sure  that  some  harm  is  affecting  our  con- 
stitution. This  harm  is  sometimes  verv  slight  and  we 
soon  recover  from  it.  Sometimes,  however,  it  is  very 
serious,  and  deprives  us  even  of  life.  But  when  we 
experience  pleasure,  we  are  not  so  sure  that  no  harm 
is  done  us.  A  man  may  experience  pleasure  in  eating 
avgood  dinner,  but  that  very  dinner  may  make  him 
sick.  Hence,  it  is  necessary  that  knowledge  should 
direct  our  enjoyments  in  a  certain  manner  and  amount. 

Now  it  belongs  to  tlie  political  economist  to  explain 
in  what  way  objects  for  our  physical  happiness  may 
be  obtained.  It  belongs  to  the  physician  to  show  in 
what  manner  these  blessings  may  be  used  consistently 
with  health.  And  the  mental  philosopher  must  ex- 
plain the  laws  of  mind  which  cannot  be  violated  with- 
out loss  of  happiness.  It  remains  for  us  in  a  future 
chapter  to  show  tlic  will  of  the  Creator  respecting  hu- 
man happiness. 


■I 


60 


Ethica. 


The  Will  of  Deity. 


61 


PART  II. 


chapt£:r  I. 


THE  WILL  OF  DEITY. 


If  we  admit  that  everytliing  which  exists,  has  been 
created  bv  an  omniscient  Creator,  it  will  follow,  that 
each  particular  thing  must  have  been  created  by  de- 
sign. For,  an  intelligent  machinist  makes  no  particu- 
lar item  in  the  mechanism  which  he  constructs,  with- 
out design.  Each  j»articular  part  is  always  intended 
to  perform  some  function,  to  add  strength  or  dura- 
bility, to  give  beauty,  or  to  fill  up  some  void  which 
niidit  occur  in  the  arrangement.  And  as  the  human 
machinist  does  not  make  any  thing  without  design,  it 
is  very  unreasonable,  and  indeed  absurd,  to  suppose 
that  an  omniscient  being  should. 

Now  if  we  knew  all  the  designs  of  the  Creator  re- 
specting the  existence  of  each  thing  created  on  earth, 
and  respecting  its  relations  to  other  things,  we  would 
then  be  acquainted  with  the  whole  will  of  Deity  re- 
specting the  world  and  the  things  in  it.  For,  the  will 
of  Deity  must  have  had  reference  to  the  existence  of 
each  object,  and  to  the  preservation  of  itself  or  of  its 
species,  for  at  least  a  period  of  time,  and  to  each  ob- 


ject's relations  to  other  objects  in  a  system.  Whether 
man  will  ever  possess  such  knowledge,  we  do  not 
know.  But,  that  much  knowledge  of  the  Creator's 
will  may  be  learned  from  nature  is  evident.  For  in 
all  the  works  of  nature,  which  we  understand,  we  can 
perceive  intention.  2.  f.,  the  adapting  means  to  accom- 
plish an  end.  And  wherever  we  can  perceive  the  in- 
tention, we  may  also  discern  the  will  of  the  Creator. 
For,  we  cannot  suppose  an  omniscient  being  to  produce- 
accidental  or  experimental  effects.  Now  all  nature 
is  divided  into  three  classes  of  objects,  viz  :  unorgan- 
ized, organized  inanimate,  and  organized  animate  ob- 
jects. In  unorganized  objects,  the  human  mind  can 
perceive  intention  by  considering  the  effects  which 
they  produce  on  organized  objects.  Thus,  carbon,  in 
itself  considered,  exhibits  no  intention.  If,  however, 
we  be  made  certain  of  the  fact,  that  it  is  one  of  the 
elements  that  support  vegetation,  and  that  in  the  pro- 
sent  system  vegetation  cannot  exist  without  it,  w^e 
may  then  clearly  perceive  intention.  For  vegetation 
cannot  be  an  accidental  effect.  In  the  relations,  there- 
fore, which  unorganized  objects  bear  to  the  organized, 
we  can  perceive  the  intention  and  discern  the  will  of 
the  Creator. 

In  organized  inanimate  objects  we  can  perceive  in- 
tention in  the  organization  itself,  and  in  the  relations 
which  they  bear  to  animate  organizations.  A  grain 
of  wheat  possesses  a  germinating  principle.  This 
springs  from  the  ground  in  an  organized  stalk,  whose 


62 


Ethica. 


The  Will  of  Deity. 


63 


organism  is  preoisely  adapted  to  produce  the  ear. 
Now  in  the  organization  of  the  stalk,  we  can  perceive 
the  intention  of  producing  grains  of  wheat.  Each  new 
grain  possesses  a  germinating  principle,  in  which  we 
perceive  the  further  intention  of  perpetuating  the 
species.  In  the  relations  also  of  inanimate  to  animate 
organizations,  we  can  perceive  intention.  For,  the 
animate  cannot  exist  without  the  inanimate  organiza- 
tions. 

In  the  relations  of  organized  inanimate  objects  to 
each  other,  however,  we  can  perceive  no  intention. 
For  no  one  is  in  any  manner  dei-endent  upon  another. 
Unless,  perhaps,  there  be  intention  in  the  relations  of 
tendril  plants  and  the  organized  objects  to  which  they 
cling,  or  in  the  relations  of  organized  objects  to  para- 
sital  plants,  such  as  the  misletoe.  Neither  can  we 
perceive  intention  in  the  relations  which  organized 
objects,  either  animate  or  inanimate,  bear  to  the  unor- 
ganized. For  the  latter  are  in  no  way  dependent 
upon  the  former,  but  the  former  upon  the  latter. 

In  animate  objects,  we  can  perceive  intention  in  the 
physical  and  mental  organizations,  in  the  relations 
which  one  species  bears  to  another,  and  in  the  case  of 
man  in  the  relations  of  one  man  to  another.  In  the 
physical  organization  of  the  ox,  we  can  perceive  inten- 
tion in  each  bone  and  muscle,  in  the  eve  and  ear,  and 
in  the  teeth.  And  in  his  mental  organization,  if  we 
may  use  the  expression,  we  can  perceive  an  exact  adap- 
tation of  mind  to  pursue  those  habits  which  render  him 


physically  and  mentally  happy.  And.  so  of  the  rest 
of  the  bj-ute  creation.  But  except  in  the  relations  of 
sex,  and  of  parent  and  offspring,  we  can  perceive  no 
intention  in  the  relations  of  one  to  another  of  the 
same  species  in  the  brute  creation.  For  one  cannot 
assist  another  in  acquiring  knowledge,  or  in  obtaining 
happiness.  In  the  relations  of  one  species  to  another, 
however,  we  can  frequently  perceive  intention.  For 
some  species  are  carnivorous,  and  cannot  exist  ex- 
cept upon  animate  organizations.  And  as  the  Deity 
has  created  them,  the  intention  of  supporting  their 
lives  must  have  entered  into  other  species. 

Now  from  what  has  been  said,  it  must  appear  that, 
in  many  instances,  we  can  clearly  trace  intention,  i.  e., 
the  adapting  means  to  accomplish  an  end,  from  unor- 
ganized to  organized  objects,  both  animate  and  inani- 
mate, from  organized  inaminate  to  animate  organiza- 
tions and  from  one  species  to  another  of  animate  organ- 
izations. We  cannot,  however,  trace  intention  in  the 
reverse  order.  But  on  examination,  however,  of  an 
organized  object,  either  animate  or  inanimate,  we  may 
frequently  infer  intention  to  have  entered  into  some 
other  object.  For,  if  we  clearly  perceive  an  object  to 
be  precisely  adapted  to  receive  a  given  effect,  and  this 
effect  to  be  absolutely  necessary  to  the  well-being  and 
existence  of  the  object,  we  may  clearly  infer  that  if  the 
Creator  willed  its  existence  and  well-being.  He  intend-, 
ed  some  object  to  produce  this  effect  upon  it.  And  it 
may  be  laid  down  as  a  general  rule  without  exceptions, 


mm 


ikito 


iiii 


64 


Ethica. 


that  where  an  object  is  precisely  adapted  to  receive  a 
given  efifect,  and  cannot  tlirive  or  exist  without  it, 
while  there  are  various  other  objects  precisely  adapted 
to  produce  it,  some  one  at  least  of  these  latter  objects 
must  have  been  intended  for  that  purpose.  In  the  re- 
lation of  food  to  animate  life,  we  have  an  illustration 
of  the  rule.  Nutriment  must  be  received  or  life  can- 
not exist.  And  further,  in  animate  objects,  when  it 
is  necessary  that  an  effect  be  received,  and  objects  to 
produce  it  can  be  procured  only  in  a  certain  manner, 
we  may  clearly  infer  intention  to  have  entered  into 
this  manner.  For  the  manner  is  a  necessary  antece- 
dent to  a  consequent,  which  is  necessary.  Keeping  in 
view  then,  that  where  we  perceive  the  intention  we 
can  also  discern  the  will,  we  will  proceed  to  examine 
man  with  reference  to  the  Creator's  will  respecting 
his  actions. 


Intention  exhibited  in  Body  and  Mind.      65 


CHAPTER    II. 

INTENTION   EXHIBITED   IN   BODY   AND   MIND. 

Man  is  composed  of  body  and  mind.  And  in  each 
of  these  we  can  perceive  intention,  i,  e.,  the  adapting 
means  to  accomplish  an  end.  We  will  first  examine 
intention  in  the  body.  And  the  first  end  which  we 
will  notice,  in  whose  antecedents  we  can  perceive  in- 
tention, is  the  animate  life  of  man. 

Without  inquiring  into  the  manner  the  first  man 
was  brought  into  existence,  let  us  see  in  what  way  ani- 
mate life  is  brought  about  in  our  day.  The  infant 
first  begins  to  exhibit  an  organization  ;  these  organs 
then  begin  to  draw  nourishment  to  themselves,  and 
when  they  are  sufficiently  developed  and  nourished, 
they  perform  their  several  functions,  and  animate  life 
follows.  And  as  life  cannot  be  an  accidental  or  ex- 
perimental effect,  the  intention  exhibited  in  the  corpo- 
real organism  shows  that  the  Creator  willed  the  ani- 
mate life  of  man. 

Next,  the  preservation  of  the  life  of  each  individual 
for  a  period  of  time.  We  find  that  in  case  of  any 
harm  happening  the  bodily  organization,  certain  re- 
medial secretions  are  formed  about  the  injured  part  j 
and  in  whatever  way  injury  may  be  received,  whether 
by  poison  in  the  stomach,  or  by  the  sting  of  a  serpent, 

7 


66 


Ethic  A. 


the  body  always  makes  an  effort  to  free  itself  from  the 
harm.  And  in  this  we  may  perceive  the  intention  of 
preserving  life.  And  although  there  be  an  adapta- 
tion in  many  things  to  produce  harm,  and  even  death, 
yet  I  apprehend  it  can  be  shown  that  they  were  not 
adapted  for  that  jairpose  by  the  Creator.  For,  if 
thev  were,  then  it  is  the  will  of  Deitv  that  they  shall 
produce  their  effects,  sooner  or  later,  upon  the  life  of 
each  individual. 

If  they  x)roduce  their  effects  immediately  upon  man^s 
coming  into  life,  th.en  the  Creator  must  have  willed 
man^s  existence,  and  at  the  same  time  prepared  means 
for  his  destruction,  i.  c,  willed  his  non-existence, 
which  is  perfectly  absurd.  But  if  they  are  to  take 
effect  at  a  later  period,  then  ho  who  lives  to  old  age 
and  does  not  die  by  poison,  has  transgressed  the  will 
of  Deity  by  doing  so.     I  apprehend  no  person  will 

believe  this. 

But  the  animate  life  itself,  in  whose  antecedents  we 
perceive  intention,  is  a  necessary  antecedent  to  human 
actions,  respecting  which  we  arc  to  inquire  into  the 
will  of  Deity.  And  to  enable  the  human  mind  to  pro- 
duce actions  either  upon  mind  or  matter,  w^e  perceive 
the  intention  in  the  body.  In  order,  however,  that  a 
man  may  produce  intentional  actions,  he  must  first 
have  ideas.  Let  us  therefore  examine  the  intention 
in  the  body  respecting  ideas  in  the  mind.  It  is  well 
known  that  all  our  ideas  of  the  existence  of  external 
objects  are  derived  through  the  bodily  senses.     And 


MiM 


Mritai 


MiKii 


Intention  exhibited  in  Body  and  Mind.      67 


when  a  child  comes  into  the  world,  the  body  immedi- 
ately begins  to  convey  ideas  to  the  mind.  From  every 
point  to  which  the  eye  is  directed  there  flow  ideas  of 
color,  shape,  and  configuration  ;  every  breath  of  air 
brings  ideas  of  sound  ;  every  substance  which  the  body 
touches  leaves  ideas  of  touch  ;  everything  put  into  the 
mouth  adds  ideas  of  taste  ;  and  every  thing  applied 
to  the  nose  gives  ideas  of  scent.  And  in  childhood 
the  mind  must  very  rapidly  gather  ideas.  For  then 
each  object  possesses  novelty  and  excites  and  impresses 
the  mind.  And  were  these  bodily  senses  wanting,  the 
mind  could  not  possess  any  knowledge  of  external 
objects.  Now  this  knowledge  is  received  by  the  mind 
in  its  passive  capacity. 

Hence  we  can  trace  intention  directly  through  the 
body  from  external  objects  to  the  ideas  of  them  in  the 
mind.  But  the  human  mind  in  itself  has  no  power  to 
create  any  new  law,  or  to  modify  any  law  already 
established,  but  must  take  every  thing  as  it  finds  it. 
Now  inertia  is  a  property  of  all  matter,  and  gravita- 
tion affects  each  particle.  Were  the  mind,  therefore, 
not  connected  with  some  material  mechanism,  whose 
forces  it  can  put  into  operation  and  direct,  it  could 
never  remove  a  stone  from  its  place.  But  without 
human  action  man  cannot  exist.  We  may,  therefore, 
clearly  trace  intention  from  exertion  in  the  mind 
through  the  body,  and  through  extraneous  antecedents 
to  human  actions. 

Now.  many  human  actions,  which  we  may  clearly 


Mriiy 


rii^ 


68 


EimcA. 


perceive  the  Creator  to  have  intended  to  be  accom- 
plished, are  left  for  man  to  perform.  Some  of  these 
are  indicated  by  the  intention  exhibited  in  the  body. 
And  the  first  we  will  notice  is  the  procuring  food  to- 
sustain  life.  We  cannot  doubt  that  the  Deity  intend- 
ed man  to  procure  food.  For  organism  and  nourish- 
ment to  this  organism  are  necessary  antecedents  to 
man's  animate  life  on  earth  ;  and  after  a  child  has 
come  into  the  world,  the  manner  of  receiving  nourish- 
ment is  changed,  but  it  must  still  be  received,  or  life 
cannot  exist.  Hence  the  intention  in  the  relation  of 
food  to  man  must  be  clear.  But  food  cannot  be  pro- 
cured without  exertion,  i,  e.,  without  human  actions 
being  brought  about.  The  will  of  Deity  must  there- 
fore be  evident. 

But  again  ;  in  the  present  system  of  things,  man 
cannot  thrive,  and  it  militates  against  his  very  exist- 
ence to  do  without  clothing.  In  many  latitudes  it  is, 
perhaps,  impossible  for  man  to  exist,  even  in  a  most 
wretched  condition,  without  some  sort  of  clothing  and 
houses.  But  clothing  and  houses  for  man's  preserva- 
tion and  comfort  are  human  actions,  ^.  «.,  effects  pro- 
duced by  man's  exertion.  We  may  therefore  clearly 
infer  that  the  Creator  intended  man  to  procure  cloth- 
ing, t.  e.,  intention  entered  into  the  antecedents  neces- 
sary to  man's  health  and  comfort.  Again,  in  the  body 
we  perceive  the  intention  of  perpetuating  the  species. 

Next,  of  intention  exhibited  in  the  human  mind. 
And  the  first  intentional  end  which  we  will  notice 


Intention  exhibited  in  Body  and  Mind.      69 

is  the  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  things.  Know- 
ledge of  things  and  of  their  relations  to  man  is 
absolutely  necessary  to  man's  existence.  Could  not 
man  acquire  a  knowledge  of  some  things,  and  of  their 
adaptation  for  food,  he  would  immediately  perish  ; 
could  he  gain  no  knowledge  of  things  adapted  for  his 
comfort,  he  would  live  wretchedly.  Did  he  possess 
no  knowledge  of  things  which  will  harm  him,  he  could 
never  avoid  them.  But  the  senses  without  reflection 
teach  man  neither  the  adaption  of  things  with  which 
he  is  surrounded,  nor  the  nature  of  his  own  constitu- 
tion. And  hence  we  should  infer,  that  intention  must 
have  entered  into  some  active  faculties  of  the  mind  ; 
and  in  the  reflective  faculties  we  find  the  means  exactly 
adapted  to  accomplish  this  end.  Man  can  learn  by 
his  own  experience  and  reflection  ;  and  by  observing 
one  man's  experience,  others  can  learn  without  expe- 
rience. And  further,  by  observation  and  reflection, 
man  can  learn,  and  it  is  necessary  that  he  should,  that 
like  causes,  ceteris  paribus,  will  always  produce  like 
effects.  This  implies  a  knowledge  of  principle.  And 
the  discovery  of  principles  is  the  object  of  every  sci- 
ence. We  may  therefore  clearly  infer  that  the  Creator 
intended  man  to  cultivate  science,  i.  e.,  intention  en- 
tered into  the  faculties  adapted  to  this  end. 

But  again,  without  society,  sufficient  knowledge  for 
the  continuation  and  well-being  of  the  human  race 
cannot  be  gained.  Society  is,  therefore,  a  necessary 
condition  to  man's  existence  and  well-being,  and  must 


iaiaMMI«H 


m^ 


ill 


70 


Ethica. 


have  been  intended  by  the  Almighty.  But  unless  some 
distinctions  of  right  and  wrong  be  in  some  degree 
observed  among  men,  society  cannot  exist.  And  we 
find  the  human  mind  adapted  to  perceive,  and  impel- 
led to  observe  moral  distinctions.  And  our  moral 
constitutions  influence  us  in  two  directions,  viz  :  to 
reverence  the  Creator,  and  to  respect  the  rights  of 
others.  These  ends,  therefore,  are  intentional,  and  in 
their  antecedents  we  can  perceive  intention. 

Again,  in  accomplishing  all  the  intentional  ends 
which  we  perceive  either  in  body  or  mind,  man  expe- 
riences pleasure,  i.  e.,  is  made  happy.    By  eating  we 
both  preserve  life  and  experience  pleasure,  i.  e.,  it  is 
an  antecedent  to  both  these  consequents.    Proper  in- 
tellectual exertion  also  is  an  antecedent  to  both  discov- 
ery and  happiness.    By  each  sense  we  obtain  ideas 
and  receive  happiness.     And  in  the  accomplishment 
of  any  intentional  end  of  our  constitution  whatever, 
happiness  also  always  follows  the  antecedents  to  this 
end.     On  the  other  hand,  for  the  nonaccomplishment 
of  these  intentional  ends,  man  always  receives  misery. 
If  a  man  will  not  eat,  he  will  destroy  his  life,  one  of 
the  intentional  ends  of  the  Creator.     But  for  his  absti- 
nence, he  will  receive  misery  while  life  lasts.     And 
this  is  the  case  with  the  nonuse  or  abuse  of  every  facul- 
ty whicli  the  Creator  has  given  us.     And  this  teaches 
ns  that  the  Creator  intended  every  faculty  to  be  used, 
and  that  happiness  was  intended  for  man.     But  there 


Intention  exhibited  in  Body  and  Mind.      71 

must  obviously  be  a  manner  and  an  amouht  of  legiti- 
mate use  of  each  faculty. 

For,  a  man  may  eat  innutritious  food,  or  he  may 
eat  nutrition  food  to  such  an  amount  that  he  will  re- 
ceive injury. 

Now  the  abuse  of  manner  and  of  the  amount  of 
legitimate  use  of  any  faculty  is  indicated  by  pain  in 
the  faculty  itself,  or  by  injury  to  some  other  faculty. 
If  we  endeavor  to  test  the  smoothness  of  objects  by 
the  eye,  we  will  soon  experience  pain  in  this  faculty, 
because  the  manner  of  use  is  illegitimate.    But  all  our 
faculties  may  be  expanded  by  the  legitimate  use  j  and 
the  desire  to  use  them  will  increase  with  this  expan- 
sion.    And  hence,  one  faculty  may  be  made  to  afford 
happiness  in  a  higher  degree  than  others,  and  to  be 
almost  the  only  source  of  pleasure.    But  when  this  is 
the  case  we  will  always  find,  that  other  faculties  have 
received  a  positive  injury.     And  mostly  we  will  expe- 
rience pain  in  these  other  faculties  ;  if  not,  we  will 
always  experience  that  unhappiness  which  invariably 
follows  from  their  nonuse.     And  this  teaches  us  that 
the  Creator  intended  us  to  use  each  faculty  in  a  legiti- 
mate manner,  and  only  to  a  certain  amount ;  and  that 
this  amount  shall  be  such  as  will  not  interfere  with 
the  use  of  each  of  the  others.    And  if  each  faculty  be 
legitimately  used  to  an  amount  sufficient  to  accomplish 
the  end  for  which  it  was  designed  and  no  more,  we 
will  find  the  use  of  every  faculty  to  be  harmonious. 
And  in  this  manner,  each  man  would  enjoy  the  great- 


II 


Mi«M 


mattmmmimimmmi 


72 


Ethica. 


est  amount  of  happiness  of  which  his  being  is  capable. 
And  such  evidently  is  the  will  of  the  Creator  in  man's 
creation.  And  such  would  really  be  the  case  in  the 
world,  were  it  not  for  the  ignorance,  the  vices,  and 
oppressions  among  men. 

Reflection  upon  the  above. — The  mind  is  the  intel- 
ligent and  active  principle  in  man.  The  body  is  an 
organic  mechanism.  And  this  mechanism  of  itself 
produces  certain  effects  independent  of  the  exertion  of 
mind.  But  in  this  mechanism  we  perceive  certain  in- 
tentional ends  indicated,  which  can  be  accomplished 
only  by  the  mind's  exertion.  Now,  every  intelligent 
machinist  looks  first  at  the  properties  and  laws  of  the 
materials  with  which  his  machine  is  to  work  ;  and 
frames  his  machine  of  such  materials  and  upon  such 
laws  as  will  suitably  adapt  it  for  the  intended  busi- 
ness. In  making  the  machine  he  has  in  view  certain 
effects  ;  and  to  produce  those  effects  is  his  sole  object 
in  making  the  machine.  And  by  analogy,  such  is  the 
case  with  our  Creator.  Now  if  any  man  derange  the 
work  of  an  artist  so  that  it  cannot  accomplish  the  ends 
for  which  it  was  designed,  he  evidently  thwarts  the 
will  of  ifs  maker.  But  the  will  of  Deity  is  law,  and 
he  who  thwarts  his  will  is  guilty  of  a  moral  wrong. 
But  further,  where  the  Almighty  has  adapted  the 
means  to  accomplish  an  end,  it  is  evidently  his  will 
that  this  end  should  be  accomplished  ;  and  the  omit- 
ting to  accomplish  it  is  a  moral  wrong.     Hence,  those 


Right  to  the  Earth. 


n 


actions  indicated  by  the  exhibition  of  intention,  in 
man's  physical  or  mental  constitutions  are  positive 
duties,  and  the  omitting  to  accomplish  them  is  moral- 
ly wrong. 


CHAPTEK    III. 


RIGHT  TO   THE   EARTH. 


Man  has  been  created  and  placed  upon  the  earth ,, 
and  of  necessity  he  must  occupy  some  locality.  If  he 
offered  no  resistance  to  the  encroachments  of  wild 
beasts,  he  would  not  only  be  driven  from  place  to 
place,  but  must  eventually  be  destroyed.  For,  no 
compromise  can  be  made  with  beasts  of  prey  or  venom- 
ous  reptiles.  They  must  be  driven  from  the  habita- 
tions of  men  or  be  permitted  to  exterminate  the  human 
race.  Now,  in  the  constitution  of  man  we  perceive 
that  progress  in  knowledge  and  virtue  is  a  law  of  our 
nature.  And  man  is  urged  to  make  this  progress  by 
the  love  of  knowledge,  by  the  desire  for  happiness, 
and  bv  necessitv.  Neither  has  the  ultimatum  of  hu- 
man  progress  yet  been  reached,  nor  as  yet  can  we  have 
any  idea  of  its  limits.  As  yet,  we  cannot  j^erceive 
any  limit  to  the  oldest  science  ;  and  new  and  fresh 


*! 


mamBoasiiii^siati^taaltttmimtmimiiiMm 


u 


Ethica. 


fields  are  now  and  again  opening  to  be  explored  by 
the  human  mind. 

In  beasts,  however,  we  perceive  no  adaptation  for 
mating  progress.  At  the  present  time  they  possess  no 
more  knowledge,  but  are  in  every  respect  on  the  same 
footing  as  they  were  in  the  earliest  ages.  And  evi- 
dently the  Creator  intentionally  made  the  constitution 
of  things  as  we  find  them.  Human  progress  is  there- 
fore, intentional,  i.  c,  intention  entered  into  its  ante- 
cedents ;  and  the  prevention  of  this  progress  must  be 
contrary  to  the  will  of  Deity.  We  may ,  therefore,  clear- 
ly infer  that  man's  right  to  the  earth  is  paramount. 

But  again,  in  the  very  early  period  of  man's  exist- 
ence but  little  knowledge  of  the  arts,  and  almost  none 
of  the  sciences  was  possessed.  The  actual  history  of 
mankind  exhibits  progress  from  barbarism.  And  as 
agriculture  was  then  but  little  understood,  man  must 
have  subsisted  upon  spontaneous  fruits,  upon  other 
animals,  or  have  perished.  But  at  the  present  day, 
the  spontaneous  fruits  of  the  most  favored  countries 
would  preserve  the  existence  of  but  a  very  sparse  popu- 
lation. And  in  many  latitudes  perhaps  it  is  impossi- 
ble for  man  to  live  entirely  upon  vegetable  food.  And 
we  must  suppose  this  to  have  been  the  case  when  m  in 
came  upon  the  earth.  And  hence,  at  tliat  time  ani- 
mal food  was  a  necessary  antecedent  to  man's  exist- 
ence. And  at  the  present  time  if  animal  food  were 
denied  man,  millions  of  human  beings,  if  not  the  human 
race,  must  soon  perish.    Hence,  in  the  relations  of  ani- 


RlGHT  TO   THE   EaRTH. 


75 


^ 


mal  food  to 'man,  we  must  perceive  intention.  But 
again,  the  use  of  beasts  in  the  work  of  production  is 
one  of  the  first  steps  towards  civilization.  And  until 
natural  agents  to  take  their  place  have  been  discover- 
ed and  made  subservient,  beasts  must  of  necessity  be 
used.  Hence,  from  what  has  been  said,  it  follows 
that  upon  earth  man  is  the  favorite,  and  has  his  Mak- 
er's will  to  use  tlic  earth  and  the  things  in  it. 


CHAPTEH   IV. 

BIGHT   OF   PROPERTY. 

If  any  man  were  isolated  from  other  men,  he  might 
make  his  habitation  where  he  chose,  use  the  fruit  of  any 
tree  he  liked,  take  those  animals  he  wanted,  and  culti- 
vate the  spot  most  convenient  to  himself ;  and  by  doing 
so,  he  would  be  but  exercising  his  moral  rights.  But, 
as  we  have  seen,  man's  constitution  exhibits  the  inten- 
tion of  living  in  society.  And  the  actual  history  of 
man  shows,  that  men  not  only  have  a  natural  d^>ire 
for  society,  but  cannot  happily  endure  solitude.  For 
those  persons  who  have  isolated  themselves,  have  been 
among  the  most  miserable  of  the  human  race.  The 
constitution  and  attachment  of  the  sexes  would  form 
little  societies,  parental  and  filial  affection  would  bind 


J 


76 


Ethica. 


together  more  members,  and  fraternal  sympathy  would 
further  augment  the  number.     And  all  this  might  be 
brought  about  without  any  member  feeling,  perhaps, 
the  need  of  society  for  the  purpose  of  gaining  that 
knowledge  requisite  to  his  happiness,  or  of  obtaining 
protection  from  the  attacks  of  beasts.     Thus  the  natu- 
ral bent  of  the  human  constitution,  irrespective  of  be- 
nefits received,  would  lead  men  to  form  societies.    But 
there  are  benefits  to  be  received  by  living  in  society, 
which  the  Deitv  must  have  intended  for  man  ;  for  they 
can  be  obtained  in  no  other  manner.    Progress  in 
knowledge  of  any  kind  cannotbe  made  without  society. 
Every  succeeding  generation  would  be  on  the  same 
footing  as  the  preceding.    No  distribution  of  labor 
could  take  place,  no  art  could  attain  to  any  perfection  ; 
the  knowledge  even  of  Deity,  and  of  moral  right, 
would  be  but  vague  imaginings  ;  and  man's  whole  ex- 
istence, if  it  could  continue,  would  be  miserable  in  the 
extreme.     But  man's  constitution  shows  that  the  Deity 
intended  better  things.    Now  when  men  come  to  live 
in  societv,  it  is  necessary  to  inquire  into  the  laws  of 
reciprocity  ;  for  if  these  be  not  understood  nor  obeyed, 
many  will  not  only  receive  no  equitable  benefit  from 
society,  but  often  will  be  subjected  to  positive  injury. 
We  have  spoken  of  the  moral  rights  which  every 
one  might  morally  (i.  e„  by  the  will  of  God,)  enjoy  in 
an  isolated  condition.     They  are  nothing  more  nor 
less  than  the  free  use  of  every  mental  and  corporeal 
faculty  in  its  legitimate  office,  upon  any  object  of  de- 


rtrtf-Thniiil 


Right  of  Pkoperty. 


77 


sire  whatever.  No  law  of  reciprocity  could  be  vio- 
lated. And  upon  entering  society,  the  only  directly 
proliibitory  modifications  of  natural  right,  which  can 
be  made  upon  any  general  rule,  are  the  prohibiting  the 
use  of  a  certain  faculty  or  faculties  entirely,  the  limit- 
ing the  amount  of  use  of  certain  faculties,  the  prohib- 
iting the  use  of  certain  species  of  objects,  and  the  pro- 
hibiting the  use  of  certain  objects  (not  species  of  ob- 
jects). Now  we  cannot  believe  the  Almighty  intended 
any  man  to  be  entirely  deprived  of  the  use  of  any 
faculty.  For,  He  made  each  faculty  for  the  express 
purpose  of  being  used.  Neither  can  society  limit  the 
amount  of  use  of  any  facultv  without  manifestly  thwart- 
ing the  will  of  Deity.  If,  for  instance,  the  quantity  of 
food  that  may  be  eaten  by  each  individual  be  pre- 
scribed, and  this  quantity  be  sufficient  to  satisfy  the 
wants  and  consequent  desires  of  the  greatest  eaters, 
the  limitation  amounts  to  nothing.  If  it  do  not  satisfy 
the  wants  of  tliose  who  require  the  most,  the  will  of 
Deity  is  violated.  For  He  made  their  constitutions 
such,  that  they  require  a  greater  quantity.  The 
amount  of  use  of  any  faculty  therefore  must  be  left  for 
every  individual  to  regulate  for  himself  upon  moral 
principles.  Other  men  have  nothing  to  do  Avitli  it. 
But  if  certain  species  of  objects  be  prohibited,  these 
species  are  entirely  excluded  from  every  man's  use.  If 
certain  objects  (not  species)  be  prohibited,  these  objects 
can  be  enjoyed  by  nobody.  If  either  of  these  arrange- 
ments be  according  to  the  will  of  the  Creator,  there 

8 


78 


Ethica. 


Eight  of  Property. 


79 


must  be  some  species  of  objects,  or  some  objects,  which 
no  man  has  aiiv  moral  right  to  touch.  Such  cannot 
be  the  condition  of  society  intended  by  the  Deity  ; 
hence  no  direct  prohibition  of  natural  right  can  mo- 
rally, i.  e.,  by  the  will  of  God,  be  made  by  society. 

The  only  general  rule,  therefore,  which  can  morally 
be  established  by  society,  is  the  permitting  each  indi- 
Tidual  to  freely  use  all  his  faculties  upon  the  unused 
stock  of  objects  in  the  world.  And  as  two  men  can- 
not use  the  same  object  at  the  same  time,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  inquire  into  the  manner  in  which  the  moral 
right  of  use  is  distributed.  Now  all  objects  which  a 
man  may  receive  from  nature  and  appropriate  to  his 
exclusive  use,  may  be  divided  into  two  classes,  viz., 
land,  with  the  things  on  it  and  in  it,  and  wild  ani- 
mals.    Let  us  first  consider  land. 

If  any  one  should  pre-occupy  any  spot  for  an  habi- 
tation, this  spot  would  then  be  in  u.c  ;  and  as  the  use 
can  be  enjoyed  simultaneously  but  by  one  individual, 
the  pre-occupier,  in  whom  the  use  is  already  vested, 
must  have  the  moral  right.  For,  before  the  locality 
was  occupied,  each  man's  moral  right  to  use  it  was 
equal.  And  by  one  man's  occupying  it,  an  unoccupi- 
er's  right  cannot  certainly  be  made  better.  But  the 
occupier  has  a  vested  right ;  and  certainly  one's  vested 
right  cannot  morally  (i.  e.,  by  the  will  of  Deity,)  be 
set  aside  by  another,  whose  right  was  but  equal  to  the 
occupier's  before  the  use  became  vested.  And  this 
doctrine,  I  believe,  has  been  acquiesced  in  by  all 


authors,  from  Cicero  to  the  present  time.  But  it  must 
be  evident  that  the  right  of  possession  continues  no 
longer  than  a  person  continues  the  use.  If  he  move 
away,  the  spot  again  falls  into  the  common  unused 

stock. 

But  again  :  each  individual's  faculties  belong  to  him- 
self; and  it  most  frequently  happens  that  the  benefit 
to  be  derived  from  the  use  of  one's  faculties  is  not  im- 
mediate. The  farmer  who  sows  his  wheat  one  fall, 
receives  not  the  benefit  of  his  labor  until  the  harvest 
of  the  next  autumn  be  gathered.  Hence  the  moral 
right  of  possession  must  continue  until  the  benefits  of 
labor  may  be  received,  though  the  spot  be  not  actually 
from  day  to  day  used  by  the  occupant.  When,  how- 
ever, a  man  has  received  the  benefits  of  his  labor,  and 
moves  away,  he  has  lost  his  moral  right  by  pre-occu- 
pancy,  and  he  carries  with  him  the  fruits  of  his  labor. 
The  place  is  therefore  in  common  again. 

But  again  ;  he  who  brings  a  piece  of  wild  land  into 
cultivation,  produces  a  utility  inseparable  from  the  land  ; 
and  if  buildings  and  fencing  be  placed  upon  it,  these 
also  are  products  produced  by  man's  faculties.  And 
if  a  man's  faculties  be  his  own,  whatsoever  product  of 
utility  he  may  create,  must  be  his  own  also.  And  to 
deprive  any  one  of  products  which  he  may  create,  is 
tantamount  to  depriving  him  of  the  use  of  his  faculties. 
This  is  evidently  morally  wrong,  i.  €.,  contrary  to  the 
will  of  Deity.  Hence  the  utility  created  by  bringing 
wild  land  into  cultivation  belongs  to  him  who  has 


80 


Ethica. 


produced  it,  and  he  may  morally  exchange  it  with 
another  individual  for  an  equivalent,  or  bestow  it  as  a 
free  gift  to  a  friend.  And  this  short  account  seems 
to  me  to  explain  sufficiently  the  moral  right  of  enjoy- 
ing and  transferring  real  estate. 

Concerning  wild  animals  the  same  principles  will 
apply.  If  they  be  domesticated,  they  belong  to  him 
who  has  tamed  them.  If  permitted  to  become  wild 
again,  they  again  become  common  stock.  Such  is  the 
common  law  and  such,  I  apprehend,  is  the  moral  law. 

Now  when  things  which  are  the  immediate  gift  of  the 
Creator,  have  been  distributed  among  the  members  of 
society,  according  to  the  laws  of  reciprocity,  each  per- 
son may  apply  his  physical  and  mental  faculties  to  the 
production  of  utilities  from  the  objects  which  he  has 
received.    These  utilities,  by  political  economists,  are 
called  products.     And  as  each  one's  faculties  are  his 
own,  the  products  of  his  labor  are  his  own  also,  and 
he  may  morally  exchange  them  with  other  individuals. 
In  agriculture  nature  performs  the  greater  part  of  the 
productive  process,  and  the  utilities  are  called  agricul- 
tural products.     In  transforming  iron  from  the  ore 
into  axes,  man's  ingenuity  and  labor  have  a  greater 
part  to  perform,  and  such  utilities  are  called  manufac- 
tural  products.     The  exchange  of  products  constitutes 

commerce. 

Now  the  manner  of  acquiring  property  above  de- 
scribed seems  to  me  to  be  the  way,  and  the  only  way, 
by  which  an  individual  may  morally,  i.  e.,  by  the  will  of 


Right  of  PropePwTY. 


81 


God,  obtain  property.  The  earth  and  the  things  in  it 
were  intended  for  man ;  not  for  one  man,  nor  for 
a  certain  set  of  men,  but  for  the  human  race.  And  it 
is  absurd  to  suppose  that  any  one  man,  or  any  set  of 
men,  should  have  the  exclusive  right  to  the  earth,  while 
the  rest  of  mankind,  who  have  the  same  nature,  and 
stand  in  the  same  relations  to  the  Creator,  should  have 
no  right  to  any  of  it.  Suppose  a  tract  of  land  con- 
taining many  thousand  acres  to  be  unoccupied,  and  a 
certain  man  to  claim  it.  It  is  evident  that  a  small 
portion  of  this  land  would  be  all  that  he  himself  could 
use,  and  if  other  men  be  excluded  from  it,  the  remain- 
der must  continue  a  waste.  And  if  men  have  a  moral 
right  to  claim  large  tracts  of  land,  which  they  them- 
selves cannot  use,  and  exclude  others  from  them,  then 
one  man  may  claim  a  million  of  acres,  another  a  mil- 
lion, and  so  on.  And  by  such  an  arrangement,  a  few 
men  might  have  all  the  land  in  the  world,  and  exclude 
the  rest  of  mankind  from  the  earth.  That  such  a  state 
of  things  would  be  contrary  to  the  will  of  Deity  we 
need  not  argue.  But  we  have  shown  that  each  man 
has  a  moral  right  to  occupy,  cultivate,  and  exclusively 
own  any  piece  of  unoccupied  and  unused  land,  w^liich 
he  may  choose  for  himself.  And  without  positive  in- 
stitutions no  man  could  have  any  thing  whatever  to 
show  in  favor  of  his  owning  land  which  he  himself  had 
not  touched,  and  for  which  he  had  given  no  equivalent 
to  another,  who  had  previously  brought  it  into  culti- 


Irifi^ 


lataniihi^iAaaiaattaaii 


■MUMBMH 


82 


Ethica. 


vation.  Money  is  a  medium  of  exchange,  and  pos- 
sesses a  relative  value.  And  it  is  for  the  benefit  of 
society  (for,  as  political  economists  have  shown,  it  aids 
in  production,)  that,  instead  of  individuals  exchanging 
the  products  themselves,  which  each  has  produced, 
thev  mav  make  use  of  a  convenient  medium  of  ex- 

change. 

Now  if  an  individual  by  skill  and  industry  accumu- 
late money,  has  he  not  a  moral  right  to  give  this  as 
an  equivalent  for  vacant  lands  ?  that  he  has  a  moral 
right  to  make  an  exchange  for  property  which  another 
individual  owns,  we  do  not  doubt. 

But  no  one  individual  more  than  another  has  any 
moral  right  to  land  which  is  in  common.     Xo  such 
exchange,  therefore,  can  take  place  between  individ- 
uals.    The  exchange,  however,  in  the  present  state  of 
political  arrangements  takes  place  between  individuals 
and  governmentc.     And  in  order  that  any  set  of  men 
may  convey  a  right  to  others,  they  must  possess  this 
right  in  properis  personis^  or  as  agents  convey  the 
right  of  a  principal.     Now  if  monarchs,  oligarchs,  or 
senates,  claim  vacant  territories  for  their  own  exclu- 
sive benefit,  after  what  has  been  said,  we  need  not 
adduce  argument  to  show  that  it  is  an  unrighteous 
usurpation.     But  if  government  be  the  agent,  society 
must  be  the  principal .     In  society,  however,  the  moral 
right  to  possess  the  unused  earth  is  distributed  equally 
amonir  the  members  ;  and  no  positive  institution  which 
men  may  set  up  can  morally  (i.  €.,  by  the  will  of  God,) 


Right  of  Property. 


83 


take  upon  itself  the  agency  of  any  right  belonging  to 
an  individual,  without  such  individuaUs  consent. 

But  it  may  be  said,  that  in  the  present  state  of 
morals  an  equitable  government  is  a  great  benefit  to 
mankind  ;  and  in  order  to  enjoy  this  benefit,  it  is  ne- 
cessary that  each  individual  should  surrender,  not  only 
some  of  his  natural  rights,  i.  e.,  rights  which  he  might 
enjoy  in  an  isolated  condition,  but  also  some  rights 
which  he  might  morally  enjoy  in  a  society  without 
government  in  strict  obedience  to  the  laws  of  recipro- 
city.    All  this  we  admit ;  and  we  admit  that  govern- 
ments may  morally  have  the  supervision  of  vacant  ter- 
ritories, and   protect  those  who  go  to  occupy  them 
from  the  attacks  of  savages  and  marauding  bands  ; 
and  see  that  among  the  occupants  the  laws  of  recipro- 
city be  obeyed.     And  for  such  service  the  individuals 
are  justly  called  upon  to  surrender  an  equitable  por- 
tion of  their  goods  as  a  recompense.    But  is  it  neces- 
sary to  the  existence  of  good  government  that  each 
individual  should  surrender  the  right,  which  God  ha& 
given  him,  of  taking  from  the  common  stock,  with 
strict  regard  to  the  rights  of  others,  and  subject  himself 
to  the  hardship  of  buying  it  back  again  ?     We  believe 
it  cannot  be  shown  to  be  so.     Does  this  arrangement 
best  promote  the  welfare  of  mankind  ?    So  far  from 
its  doing  this,  on  the  contrary  we  will  endeavor  ta 
show  that  it  is  the  source  of  the  greatest  evils  to  so- 
ciety.   Now,  there  are  but  two  inducements  for  an 
individual  to  invest  money  in  wild  agricultural  lands^ 


84 


Ethica. 


which  he  himself  cannot  use.    He  either  buys  to  sell 
again,  or  to  let  out  to  tenants.    Tf  he  buy  to  sell  again, 
he  expects  to  sell  at  an  advanced  price.     And  if  unim- 
proved land  advance  in  value,  it  is  because  society 
needs  more  land  to  be  cultivated  ;  and  if  these  lands 
be  kept  a  waste,  society  is  injured  to  the  full  amount 
of  the  value  of  the  products  which  might  be  produced 
from  them.    If,  however,  they  be  sold  at  an  advance 
to  agriculturists,  all  this  purchase-money  must  be  paid 
by  the  farmer  for  the  privilege  of  exercising  those 
rights  which  he  might  have  freely  e.  joyed  per>s  Dei, 
bad  not   government  put  this  liardship   upon  him. 
This  is  the  penalty  for  surrendering  this  natural  and 
moral  right  into  the  hands  of  an  agent  making  such 
arrangements.     It  is  a  moral  wrong  and  an  injustice 
to  the  tillers  of  the  soil.     And  had  this  purchase  money 
been  left  in  the  hands  of  the  farmer  to  be  converted 
into  fixed  capital,   the   productiveness  of  his   farm 
would  have  been  greatly  increased,  and  so  far  would 
he  be  the  happier,  and  society  in  general  be  benefited. 
To  be  deprived  of  this  productiveness  is  an  injury  to 
mankind.     liut,  if  an  individual  buy  to  let  out  to 
tenants,  these  tenants  must  be  unable  to  procure  land 
for  themselves  so  near  to  any  market  that  they  may 
employ  their  labor  with   any   personal  profit.     For 
no  one  would  pay  rent  for  wild  land  under  any  feel- 
ing of  moral  obligation  without  compulsion,  for  such 
land  possesses  no  utility  whatever,  except  that  which 
nature  offers.    Hence  such  tenancy  is  a  coerced  con- 


^mhimm 


Eight  of  Property. 


85 


dition  of  the  farmer,  resulting  either  from  the  too  lim- 
ited territory  of  a  state,  or  horn  land  monopoly.  But 
providing  there  be  unmonopolized  territory  on  the 
frontier  of  a  countrv,  the  tillers  of  the  soil  then  have 
the  alternative  of  becoming  tenants,  or  of  moving  inta 
a  sparsely  settled  wilderness.  In  tlie  latter  event, 
they  are  deprived  most  generally  of  markets  for  tlieir 
products,  of  profitable  social  intercourse,  of  suitable 
medical  aid,  and  of  schools  for  their  children,  and  very 
often  subjected  to  the  demon  cruelties  of  the  relentless 
savage.  All  this  is  an  injury  to  them.  And  if  their 
children  grow  up  in  ignorance,  in  a  representative 
government,  this  is  a  political  evil.  And  further,  in  a 
state  possessing  a  large  territory,  if  the  lands  in  and 
around  the  borders  of  the  foci  of  society  be  monopo- 
lized, and  emigration,  to  any  great  extent,  takes  place 
to  lands  unclaimed  by  deedal  parchments,  such  a  move- 
ment has  a  direct  tendency  to  scatter  the  population 
of  a  countrv,  to  make  men  seek  for  themselves  a  wild 
independence,  and  to  produce  weakness  in  the  gov- 
ernment ;  conditions  of  society  most  unfavorable  to  a 
high  order  of  civilization.  This  is  an  injury  to  the 
whole  nation. 

But  suppose  all  the  lands  in  a  country  to  be  monopo- 
lized. By  the  nature  of  things,  if  the  capitalists  in 
manufacture  lower  the  wages  of  their  employees,  they 
will  endeavor  to  obtain  employment  in  commerce,  in 
the  professions,  and  in  agriculture.  And  as  land  is 
monopolized,  the  number  of  employers  remains  the 
same,  while  the  number  of  those  offering  themselves 


86 


Ethica. 


as  employees  in  these  latter  branches  of  industry,  is 
increased.     The  wages  in  all  branches  of  industry, 
therefore,  will  fall.     And  as  the  man  who  does  not 
possess  capital  of  his  own  to  which  he  may  apply  his 
industry,  must  earn  wages  from  an  employer  in  order 
to  live,  capitalists  may  reduce  the  wages  of  labor  to  that 
point  which  will  merely  keep  the  employees  alive,  and 
enable   them   to  roar  families  sufficiently  large  to 
keep  up  a  supply  of  laborers.    Such  alas,  is  the  actual 
state  of  things  in  Europe  at  the  present  time.     The 
feudal  system  of  land  tenure  commenced  in  monopoly, 
and  still  preserves  its  monopolizing  character,  though 
variously  modified  by  different  States.     And  the  result 
in  most  States  of  the  old  world  is  the  entire  subver 
sion  of  civil  liberty,  and   the  subjugation   of  man. 
And  if  in  these  States  men  cannot  effect  a  change  in 
favor  of  their  natural  and  moral  rights,  nor  emigrate 
to  countries  unblighted  by  monopoly,  they  must  ever 
remain  in  this  hopeless  condition.      In  the  United 
States,  we  have  abolished  the  feudal  laws  of  entail- 
ment.     And  as  our  territories  are  too  large  to  be 
monopolized  by  speculators  as  yet,  death  distributes 
in  parcels  the  estates  of  monopolists  to  men  of  moder- 
ate means  ;— and  unclaimed  virgin  soil  may  still  be  ob- 
tained from  government  at  moderate  prices. 

These  causes  as  yet  prevent  the  control  of  labor  to 
a  great  extent.  They  do  not,  however,  free  us  from 
the  evils  resulting  from  the  present  system  of  land 
monopoly.     And  we  Americans  too,  with  the  groans 


BBBMB 


ifiti. 


Right  of  Property. 


87 


of  Europe  in  our  ears,  are  hastening  on  to  bend  the 
servile  knee  and  do  the  menial  service  of  capitalists. 
From  the  present  system  of  acquiring  property,  we 
may  trace  a  base  disregard  of  duty  in  legislative  halls, 
a  corrupt  adjudication  of  law  in  judicial  functionaries, 
ani  a  higher  estimate  set  upon  cunning  and  device 
than  upon  skill  and  integrity ;  things  incompatible 
with  the  stability  of  a  republic,  and  destructive  to  the 
rights  of  man.  And  we  might  go  on  almost  ad  infini- 
tum, and  show  evils  brought  upon  humanity  by  chang- 
ing the  natural  order  of  things  which  God  established 
for  man,  and  erecting  in  its  stead  artificial  arrange- 
ments invented  by  feudal  despots,  or  even  dictated  by 
the  most  enlightened,  yet  short-sighted  intellects  of 
sincere  patriots. 

But  it  may  be  said,  that  if  this  natural  order  of 
things  spoken  of  were  adopted,  industrious  men  would 
be  deprived  of  one  of  the  most  secure  investments  for 
their  accumulations,  and  so  far  they  would  be  depriv- 
ed of  liberty.  That  they  would  be  deprived  of  the 
liberty  of  doing  as  they  please  is  evident.  But 
*'  civil  liberty  is  natural  liberty  so  far  restrained  and 
no  farther  than  is  necessary  for  the  good  of  society.'* 
And  to  do  as  one  may  please  is  inconsistent  with  civil 
liberty.  And  in  the  natural  state,  without  government, 
no  such  investments  could  be  made.  To  be  deprived 
therefore,  of  the  privilege  of  investing  in  lands  which 
are  in  common,  is  neither  an  infringement  of  civil  nor 
of  natural  liberty.      But  it  cannot  be  denied,  that  to 


mik 


88 


Ethica. 


prevent  individuals  from  occupying  and  owning  what 
their  industry  may  reclaim  from  nature,  is  a  direct 
infringement  of  natural  liberty  at  least. 

But  it  may  be  said,  that  it  would  at  least  be  a  hard- 
ship.    If  it  be  even  so,  the  hardships  w^hich  men  would 
be  made  to  endure  from  the  natural  order  of  things, 
would  not  approximate  in  any  degree  to  the  hardships 
which  they  are  made  to  undergo  by  the  artificial  ar- 
rangements.   But,  I  apprehend,  we  will  perceive  on 
further  investigation,  that  the  hardship  feared  is  pure- 
ly imagiAary,  and  that  a  real  benefit  would  accrue  to 
capitalists  themselves  as  well  as  to  all  other  classes  of 
society,  were  things  left  to  flow  in  their  natural  chan- 
nel.    It  will  be  said,  that  if  the  natural  manner  of 
obtaining  property  were  established,  capital  would  be 
restricted,  the  accumulations  of  industry  would  not  be 
of  equal  value  to  the  possessors,  capitalists  not  being 
able  to  employ  their  capital  to  advantage  would  flee 
to  more  congenial  climes,  the  stimulus  to   industry 
would  be  taken  away,  the  whole  capital  of  the  nation 
would  decline,  manufacture  and  commerce  w^ould  go 
down,  the  nation  would  become  poor,  and  w^retched- 
ness  and  barbarism  would  follow.     We  will  endeav- 
or to  show  these  to  be  entirely  imaginary  evil«,  and 
that  a  movement  in  a  directly  opposite  direction  would 
take  place  from  the  very  nature  of  things.    Now,  it 
will  be  evident  to  every  one  having  but  a   superfi- 
cial knowledge  of  political  economy,  that  the  sale  of 
public  lands  to  individual  citizens  by  the  government, 


Right  of  Property. 


89 


does  not  at  all  add  anything  to  the  wealth  of  the  na- 
tion. There  is  but  a  transfer  of  value  from  the  hands 
of  individuals  to  the  public  treasury.  The  whole 
amount  of  values  in  the  nation  remains  exactly  the 
same.  While  these  lands  remain  uncultivated  in  the 
possession  of  speculators,  they  are  unproductive  capi- 
tal yielding  no  item  of  national  wealth.  When  they 
are  resold  to  agriculturists  at  an  advanced  price, 
the  speculator  gains,  but  the  national  wealth  is  not 
augmented  one  farthing.  And  were  all  the  capital  of 
a  country  abstracted  from  productive  channels,  and 
invested  in  uncultivated  lands,  the  nation  would  imme- 
diately starve.  From  which,  it  will  be  easily  seen, 
that  instead  of  men's  investing  and  holding  unculti- 
vated lands  tending  to  benefit  a  country  in  a  pecuni- 
ary view,  it  has  a  direct  tendency  to  impoverish  a 
nation.  Now,  if  the  capital  which  flows  into  unpro- 
ductive lands  were  precluded  from  this  channel,  and  it 
should  even  leave  the  country  without  a  return,  the 
country  it  is  true,  would  lose  this  amount  of  capital, 
but  the  national  revenue  would  be  decreased  only  to 
the  amount  of  the  deficit  in  the  necessary  expenses  of 
the  government,  which  deficit  would  have  been  sup- 
plied by  the  annual  receipts  from  the  land  office.  The 
amount  of  such  deficit  must  be  made  up  by  products 
from  the  productive  channels,  and  cannot  be  exported 
for  a  return.  But  unless  the  productive  channels  of 
other  countries  offer  greater  inducements,  there  is  no 
9 


I'.i 


•'  I 


i 


90 


Ethica. 


danger  of  its  leaving  this.  And  if  they  do,  capital 
will  flow  thither  at  ail  events. 

Hence,  we  see  that  the  nature  of  things  would  di- 
rect the  accumulations  of  men  into  productive  channels, 
instead  of  channels  not  only  unproductive  of  national 
wealth,  but  which  cramp  production.  This  would 
increase  the  national  wealth,  and  the  capitalists  along 
with  all  classes  would  share  in  the  benefit. 

But  it  may  be  said,  that  the  natural  order  of  tilings 
would  set  each  one  to  work  on  his  own  capital,  the 
complete  division  of  labor  to  form  constituent  parts 
of  a  whole  result  could  not  take  place,  and  consequent- 
ly we  would  lose  the  benefit  derived  from  the  great 
productiveness  .caused  by  such  division.  Now  in 
every  branch  of  industry  which  does  not  admit  of  a 
division  of  labor,  there  would  be  no  loss,  but  a  posi- 
tive gain  by  each  one  laboring  upon  capital  of  his  own. 
VoT  in  this  manner,  each  one  would  produce  the  most. 
And  in  those  branches  which  admit  this  division  in 
but  a  moderate  degree,  it  is  not  difficult  to  see  that 
men  would  form  partnerships,  and  each  partner  take 
that  division  best  adapted  to  himself.  And  as  each 
division  would  then  be  plied  by  persons  immediately 
interested  in  the  general  result,  these  would  be  the 
most  favorable  circumstances  possible  for  production. 

But  it  may  be  said,  that  there  would  soon  be  no 
persons  at  all  to  be  hired  at  equitable  wages.  This 
would  not  at  all  follow.  For,  every  person  who 
should  undertake  to  reclaim  land   and  cultivate  it. 


mt^m. 


Right  of  Property. 


91 


must  have  some  capital  before  he  can  do  any  thing. 
And  if  men  received  a  full  compensation  for  their 
skill  and  industry  from  an  employer,  no  man  would 
nndertake  business  for  himself  unless  he  had  sufficient 
capital  to  carry  it  on  with  the  greatest  advantage. 
Hence,  every  man  before  becoming  a  farmer  on*  his 
own  account,  would  obtain  all  the  fixed  capital  to 
carry  on  the  business  in  the  greatest  perfection.  This 
would  add  greatly  to  the  national  wealth. 

But  it  may  be  said  that  under  the  natural  arrange- 
ment, individuals  would  reclaim  lands  from  the  wild 
state,  sell  to  others,  reclaim  again  and  again  sell,  and 
so  on.  This  no  doubt  would  take  place,  not,  however, 
with  harm  but  with  benefit,  until  the  profits  of  labor 
in  agriculture  were  in  exact  equilibrium  with  the  pro- 
fits of  labor  in  each  other  branch  of  industry.  And 
this  equilibrium  would  not  be  brought  about  until  the 
capitalists  in  manufacture  and  commerce  received  the 
due  benefits  from  their  capital ;  the  employees  the 
due  rewards  of  their  skill  and  labor  ;  the  professional 
man  an  equitable  remuneration  for  his  learning  and 
services  ;  and  the  agriculturist  the  just  relative  value 
for  his  products.  "  A  consummation  devoutly  to  be 
wished,"  and  that  state  of  society  into  which,  I  ap- 
prehend, the  Creator  intended  man  to  come.  In  a 
society  like  this,  the  frontier  would  be  immediately  on 
the  borders  of  refinement,  the  population  would  be 
condensed  by  free  will  and  natural  tendency  ;  integrity 
would  be  esteemed  and  sought  after  in  every  depart- 


92 


Ethica. 


ment ;   each  one's  peculiar  talents  would  take  that 
channel  adapted  to  themselves,  for  there  they  would 
be  sure  to  gain  their  rewards  ;  the  inducements  to 
virtue  would  be  stronger  than  those  to  vice  ;  wealth 
would  increase,  and  happiness  be  found  in  every  dwel- 
ling.   In  such  a  society,  we  would  not  of  course  per- 
ceive that  great  poverty  of  industrious  individuals, 
which  some  have  supposed  necessary  to  civilization 
and  to  the  advancement  of  national  wealth ;  a  sup- 
position borrowing  the  appearance  of  truth  from  the 
actual  condition  of  the  civilized  world,  but  which  is 
as  unphilosophical  as  it  is  derogatory  of  the  benefi- 
cent Creator.    The  equality  of  talent  and  of  indivi- 
dual wealth  is  no  doubt  but  a  dream.    But  that  each 
individual  may  be  permitted  to  secure  for  himself  the 
full  deserts  of  his  skill  and  industry,  we  believe  to  be 
highly  practical,  in  conformity  to  the  will  of  Deity, 
and  for  the  best  interest  of  mankind. 


>. 


Marriage. 


93 


CHAPTER    V 


MARRIAGE. 


Sexual  love  is  common  to  the  human  race,  and  there 
are  but  four  possible  way^  of  arranging  it,  viz.,  by 
polygamy,  by  polyandry,  by  the  free  love  system — 
meretricium — and  by  the  marriage  of  one  man  to  one 
woman.   . 

Now  it  is  a  fact  that  the  number  of  births  of  each 
sex,  and  the  number  of  each  sex  becoming  adults  in 
each  generation,  are  substantially  equal.  That  there 
may  be  slight  variations  from  this  equality  in  certain 
generations  may  naturally  be  supposed.  But  that  no 
variation  upon  any  general  law  of  nature  takes  place 
is  evident.  For  if  there  did,  by  observing  two  or  three 
generations  a  considerable  inequality  would  be  per- 
ceived. And  when  population  had  increased  upon  the 
earth  to  many  millions,  an  enormous  inequality  would 
be  apparent  in  each  generation.  And  by  observing  a 
single  State,  if  in  one  generation  the  equality  be 
destroyed  by  the  ravages  of  disease  upon  females,  or 
by  the  havoc  of  war  upon  males,  the  next  generation 
brings  along  with  it  the  equality  of  the  sexes  again. 
But  if  it  be  said  that  the  general  law  of  nature  does 
not  produce  an  equality  of  number  of  sexes,  but  that 
in  a  particular  state  the  equality  may  be  kept  up  by 


94 


Etsica. 


the  emigration  of  that  sex,  which  is  produced  in  ex- 
cess, this  assertion  must  appear  groundless.    For  let  us 
suppose  hj  the  law  of  nature  the  number  of  males  in 
each  generation  to  be  the  greater  ;  if  the  equality  in 
a  particular  state  be  kept  up  by  emigration,  it  must 
be  evident,  that  this  emigration  must  flow  to  a  state 
where  disease  or  war  had  destroyed  the  excess  of 
males,   otherwise  the  inequality  in  the   latter  state 
would  be  greatly  increased.    But  observation  on  states 
at  peace  shows  that  when  an  inequality  caused  by  im- 
migration exists  in  one  state,  an  inequality  of  an 
opposite  character  always  exists  in  the  states  from 
which  the  emigration  proceeded.     Hence  it  must  be 
evident  that  the  equality  of  number  of  sexes  is  the  law 
of  nature.     Now  if  polygamy  or  polyandry  were  uni- 
versally adopted,  (and  physiology  favors  the  one  as 
much  as  the  other,  and  both  have  been  practiced,)  then 
many  persons  would  have  to  lead  a  life  of  celibacy  by 
compulsion  ;  a  mode  of  life  which  the  Creator  clearly 
did  not  intend  for  man,  and  wliich  is  excusable  only 
under  compulsive  circumstances. 

^ut  again,  we  must  suppose  that  the  Creator  made 
all  things  perfect,  for  the  well-being  of  the  human 
race  ;  and  as  the  number  of  sexes  is  equal,  the  happi- 
ness of  a  certain  number  of  males  must  be  consistent 
with  that  of  a  like  number  of  females.  Hence  nothing 
could  be  gained  on  either  hand  by  the  free  love  sys- 
tem, which  might  not  be  enjoyed  by  judicious  mar- 
riaf^es.    If  we  add  to  this  the  fact  that  the  free  love 


\ 


i\ 


Marriage. 


95 


system  renders  the  female  degraded,  and  extinguishes 
that  self-respect  and  highmindedness  in  man  himself ; 
while  in  marriage  woman  is  respected  and  loved, 
man  is  proud  of  his  and  her  position,  sacrifices  on 
either  hand  are  readily  made  for  each  other^s  happi- 
ness, and  children  are  loved,  and  in  return  love  their 
parents,  we  cannot  doubt  that  marriage  was  intended 
by  the  Creator. 

All  authors  of  any  merit  are  agreed  upon  this  sub- 
ject, and  we  need  not  pursue  it  further.  It  is  not, 
however,  surprising  th^t  polygamy  and  free  love 
should  be  advocated  and  practiced  even  in  this  en- 
lightened age,  and  in  our  own  country  of  general  intelli- 
gence. For  it  is  common  with  men  to  mark  the  evils 
which  flow  from  the  abuse  of  a  system,  and  regard 
them  as  the  legitimate  results  of  the  system  itself. 
And  at  the  present  day  marriages  are  conducted  most 
frequently  upon  principles  of  trafific,  in  which  fortunate 
boors  and  simpering  misers  hold  the  best  stands  ;  an 
abuse  induced  by  the  general  avarice,  and  consequent 
neglect  of  right,  which  have  come  upon  our  country. 


M 


Ethica. 


CHAPTER  VI 


GOVERNMENT. 


We  have  seen  that  each  individual  has  certain 
rights  given  to  him  by  the  Creator,  and  that  the  Deity 
intended  men  to  live  in  society.    And  as  the  Creator 
intended  each  individual  to  enjoy  certain  rightful  pri- 
vileo-es.  He  must  be  consistent  with  himself,  and  could 
not  have  intended  any  thing  to  deprive  an  individual 
of  the  rights  granted.    Hence  if  anything  hinder  an 
individual  from  enjoying  his  rights,  such  hindrance 
must  be  contrary  to  the  will  of  Deity,  and  the  person 
has  a' moral  right  to  remove  it.    Thus  the  Deity  evi- 
dently intended  a  man  with  eyes  to  see,  and  hence  a 
person  not  only  has  a  moral  right,  but  is  morally 
bound  to  prevent,  if  in  his  power,  any  thing  from 
putting  out  his  eyes.     And  if  men  have  a  right  to  re- 
move impediments  to  the  enjoyment  of  their  rights, 
they  must  have  the  moral  right  to  use  those  means 
necessary  for  this  purpose.    But  suppose  an  opposition 
to  preclude  a  person  from  his  rights,  and  there  be  two 
methods  of  removing  it ;  by  the  one,  other  persons 
will  be  deprived  of  rights  which  the  Creator  originally 
intended  for  them,  while  by  the  other  the  will  of  Deity 
would  be  in  no  manner  thwarted.     Here  it  is  evident 
that  the  latter  method,  which  will  permit  all  the  in- 
tentions of  Providence  to  take  efifect,  ought  morally 


^ft. 


Government. 


97 


to  be  adopted.  But  suppose  an  opposition  to  arise, 
and  there  be  but  one  method  of  removing  it,  and  by 
this  method  certain  individuals  will  necessarily  be 
deprived  of  rights  which  were  originally  intended 
for  them,  what  ought  to  be  done?  If  the  oppo- 
sition be  brought  about  by  inanimate  nature,  or 
by  beasts,  the  individual  himself  ought  to  bear  the 
deprivation.  For  it  would  be  unjust  to  free  one  man 
from  misfortune  by  putting  it  on  another.  If,  how- 
ever, the  opposition  be  offered  by  man,  I  apprehend 
the  case  is  different ;  and  those  who  endeavor  to  de- 
prive an  individual  of  his  rights,  ought  rather  to  be 
deprived  of  rights  which  the  Creator  originally  in- 
tended for  them,  than  be  permitted  to  inflict  an  injury 
upon  an  inoffensive  person. 

Novr,  in  society,  each  individual  morally  possesses 
certain  rights,  which  are  either  morally  absolute,  {L  c, 
cannot  be  lost  by  the  individual  in  any  manner,) 
or  conditional  (i.  e.,  by  the  will  of  Deity  become  ex- 
tinguished by  certain  acts  of  the  individual  himself). 
Now  man^s  very  existence  on  earth  is  conditional.  If 
he  endeavor  to  live  on  arsenic,  he  will  cease  to  exist. 
His  existence,  his  happiness,  and  his  rights,  are  all 
conditional ;  they  depend  upon  the  laws  which  the 
Creator  has  established,  i.  e.,  upon  the  will  of  Deity. 
And  if  an  individual  violate  any  law  of  the  Creator, 
he  must  lose  the  rights  which  depend  upon  that  law. 
In  society,  each  individual  is  morally  bound  to  obey 


98 


Ethica. 


the  laws  of  reciprocity.  If  a  man  violate  them  he 
loses  the  rights  depending  thereon,  and  the  society  can 
not  do  wrong  by  taking  them  from  him.  And  hence 
it  is  evident  that  a  society  has  a  moral  right  to  make 
arrangements  for  protecting  the  rights  of  each  indi- 
vidual. 

Now  it  will  be  evident  to  every  one  on  the  slightest 
reflection,  that  if  all  mankind  would  obey  the  laws  of 
reciprocity ,  governments  would  not  only  be  unneces- 
sary, but  gratuitous  burdens.  And  if  we  should  con- 
sider the  injuries  done  to  production  by  governments, 
the  cruelties  inflicted  upon  home  subjects  and  foreign 
foes,  and  the  dearest  rights  of  man  crushed,  we  should 
be  almost  led  to  believe  that  mankind  would  not  suf- 
fer more  in  a  state  of  anarchy.  But  if  we  reflect  upon 
the  ambitions,  the  prejudices,  the  animosities,  and  cruel 
dispositions  of  men  of  the  same  and  of  different  soci- 
eties, and  consider  the  state  of  things  these  will  bring 
about  in  Anarchy,  we  will  readily  admit  that  mankind 
can  not  approximate  to  virtue  and  happiness  without 
governments.  General  utility  is,  therefore,  the  ob- 
ject to  be  aimed  at  in  forming  a  government.  And  if 
we  regard  a  society  internally,  without  reference  to 
other  societies,  I  apprehend  that  universal  utility  will 
Always  correspond  to  moral  right.  And  viewing  each 
civil*  society  as  a  moral  person,  and  a  member  of  the 
society  of  nations,  a  utility  which  is  universal  in 
this  society,  must  also  correspond  with  moral  right. 


Government. 


n 


Now  the  purposes  for  which  governments  may  mo- 
rally be  created  are  three,  viz.,  to  protect  a  society 
from  the  aggressive  injuries  of  other  societies,  to  se- 
cure to  each  individual  in  the  society  the  rights  which 
the  Creator  has  given  him ;  and  to  carry  into  effect 
any  moral  measure  which  will  be  of  general  utility. 

And  a  government  thus  established  has  a  moral 
right  to  use  those  means  necessary  to  accomplish  these 
purposes.  Unfortunately  for  man,  the  same  vices 
which  governments  are  intended  to  suppress,  creep 
into  the  government  itself,  and  direct  its  forces  to 
illegitimate  ends.  Now  as  each  individual  in  society 
must  be  engaged  in  some  occupation  of  his  own,  every 
member  cannot  act  as  a  govermenta!  functionary. 
And  hence  it  is  necessary  that  certain  offices  be  es- 
tablished, and  their  duties  and  powers  particularly 
specified ;  and  also  that  certain  individuals  be  ap- 
pointed to  fill  these  offices.  These  officers  must,  of 
course,  receive  a  remuneration  for  their  services ; 
and  to  accomplish  the  objects  for  which  the  offices  are 
created  requires  means.  These  things  constitute  the 
expenses  of  government,  and  they  must  be  furnished 
by  the  society.  Hence,  to  form  a  government,  each 
individual  must  surrender  a  ratio  of  his  property  to 
society  ;  each  individual  must  also  surrender  to  society 
the  right  of  self-protection,  so  far  as  society  is  able  to 
protect  him ;  reserving  to  himself  the  right  of  self- 
defence  in  cases  where  society's  agents  cannot  know 
his  distress  and  be  present  to  protect  him  ;  each  in- 


IDO 


Ethica. 


dividual  must  surrender  to  society  the  right  to  settle 
disputes  between  individuals,  and  to  redress  wrongs; 
and  each  individual  must  surrender  to  society  the 
right  to  make  laws  for  the  government  of  every  mem- 
ber. The  remaining  natural  rights  of  each  individual 
remain  with  himself,  and  if  they  be  taken  away  it  is 
tyranny. 


CONCLUDING  EEMARKS. 

We  will  conclude  our  outline  here.     Morality  is  a 
subject  as  broad  as  the  actions  which  man  can  perform. 
No  writer  could  investigate  all  the  circumstances  un- 
der which  human  actions  may  be  produced.      Such  a 
^ork  could  not  be  read  if  it  were  written.      And  we 
are  of  the  opinion  that  cursory  reading  will  not  be 
sufficient  to  convince  the  mind  of  the  truths  set  forth 
in  the  principles  of  moral  science.      Moral  science 
must  be  studied  carefully  and  diligently.    And  we  are 
aware  that  none  but  the  laborious  student  are  willing 
to  investigate  thoroughly  a  large  volume.    And  even 
he  will  become  fatigued  by  prolix  discussions,  and 
either  let  an  author  carry  him  along  at  his  will,  with- 
out thinking  for  himself,  or  lay  the  volume  quietly 
upon  the  shelf.    We  have,  therefore,  been  as  pointed 


Concluding?  Remarks. 


101 


and  concise  as  possible,  breaking  the  shell  of  each 
subject  treated  of,  as  soon  as  we  were  able,  putting  the 
reader  in  possession  of  the  substance  of  the  matter, 
and  leaving  him,  if  convinced  of  the  principles  dis- 
closed, to  carry  those  principles  farther  for  himself. 
Books  may  stimulate  thought  and  set  men  on  the  right 
road  to  think  correctly.  Each  individual,  however, 
must  think  for  himself,  or  he  will  have  no  fixed  prin- 
ciples of  any  kind.  Paley,  Way  land,  Alexander, 
Smith,  Hume,  Dimond,  Abercrombie  and  various  other 
authors  may  be  consulted  by  any  person  who  may  de- 
sire to  learn  all  that  able  men  have  said  upon  the 
subject.  And  we  apprehend,  that  such  a  course  of 
reading  will  satisfy  any  one  that  he  must  think  for 
himself.  Many  intelligent  business  men  in  our  coun- 
try have  concluded  that  moral  science  needs  all  the 
reputation  of  a  distinguished  author,  as  its  truths  are 
mainly  supported  by  authority. 

A  science,  if  thoroughly  studied,  will  convince  the 
mind  of  its  truths,  without  the  name  of  a  Newton  or 
a  LaPlace.  And  we  believe  that  moral  science  is  not 
a  dream,  nor  but  an  ingenious  display  of  argumenta- 
tion. If  authors  disagree  on  many  points,  it  is  no- 
thing more  than  has  taken  place  in  the  progress  of 
every  other  science.  And  were  the  disagreement  of 
authors  a  proof  of  the  futility  of  any  thing,  no  science 
could  have  made  its  way  to  be  received  as  true  by 
mankind.  We  believe  that  no  science  is  better  calcu- 
lated to  improve  the  mental  faculties,  and  elevate  the 

10 


y 


ii. 


102 


Ethica. 


character  and  conditions  of  men  than  this.    It  is  not 
mere  theory.   It  throws  light  into  the  practical  walks 
of  life.    In  a  pecuniary  point  of  view,  it  goes  hand  in 
hand  with  political  economy  to  establish  the  wealth 
and  happiness  of  a  nation.    Without  intelligence  and 
industry,  a  nation  will  dwindle  into  abject  poverty 
and  insignificance  on  the  most  favored  soil  and  under 
the  most  salubrious  clime.  Without  integrity  and  vir- 
tue, wealth  is  but  a  curse,  and  a  nation  groans  in  mis- 
ery, though  the  earth  produce  without  labor,  and  its 
coffers  be  filled  with  gold  and  silver.      In  a  republic 
everything  relating  to  government  depends  upon  the 
intelligence  and  virtue  of  the  people.    If  private  vir- 
tue and  iutegrity  be  stifled  by  the  cunning  and  un- 
principled, what  can  we  expect  but  the  most  outra- 
geous corruption  and  oppression  by  the  government. 
Under  such  circumstances,  the  natural  ties  which  bind 
men  together  are  severed,  and  each  man  possessing'a 
little  authority  becomes  a  little  tyrant,  and  teaches 
''"  bloody  instructions,  which  being  taught  return  to 
plague  the  inventor,"  and  the  nation  falls  loaded  with 
all  the  miseries  which  humanity  can  suffer.     After 
studying  what  we  have  written,  think  for  yourself. 


COL.COIJ 


N   \  V )  K  h 


CONTENTS. 


PABT  I. 

Page. 
CHAPTER  I. 

Ethics 5 

CHAPTER  II. 
Idea  of  the  Existence  of  Deity 8 

*                  CHAPTER  ni. 
Human  Action 13 

CHAPTER  IV. 
Of  Right  and  Wrong 21 

CHAPTER  Y. 
To  what,  in  Human  Actions,  Moral  Right  and  Wrong  attach ...     32 

CHAPTER  VI. 
Conscience 40 

CHAPTER  VII. 
Self-Love 46 

CHAPTER  \TII. 
Yirtue " 48 

CHAPTER  IX. 

Human  Happiness 54 

/ 


104 


Contents. 


PART  II. 


^  Page. 

CHAPTER  T. 

The  Will  of  Deity ^ 

CHAPTER  II. 
Intention  Exhibited  in  Body  and  Mind ^ 

CHAPTER  in. 
Right  to  the  Earth '** 

CHAPTER  IV. 
Right  of  Property "^^ 

CHAPTER  V. 
Marriage •  •  * 

CHAPTER  VI. 
Government • 

100 
Concluding  Remarks ^^^ 


BRYANT,  STRATTON  &  PACKARD^S 

New  Tork  City  Mercantile  College^ 


18  AND  19  COOPER  INSTITUTE. 


Til  is  Institution  forms  one  of  eight  Colleges  located  in  the  following  cities  :  New 
York,  Philadelphia.  Albany,  Butfalo.  Cleveland,  Detroit,  Chicago,  and  St.  Louis. 
A  person  holding  a  Scholarship  can  attend  either  at  his  option. 

Book-KeepioK — As  used  in  every  department  of  husiness,  taught  in  the  most 
thorough  and  practical  manner. 

Penmanship — The  "Spencerian  System  "  of  Penmanship  is  taught  in  its  perfec- 
tion and  is  universally  admitted  to  be  the  most  rapid  and  beautiful,  as  well  as  the 
most  practical  style  for  business  purposes  known  to  the  world. 

CommerRial  Calculations — Comprising  all  the  operations  necessary  to  perfect 
one  in  the  practice  of  Accountantship. 

_  Commercial  Liavr. — The  points  of  law  applicable  to  ordinary  business  transac- 
tions will  be  illustrated  and  enforced  by  familiar  lectures  from'  gentlemen  of  legal 
attainments. 

Political  Economy-^As  a  science,  will  be  inculcated  hy  lectures  and  illustrations. 

GENERAL  INFORMATION. 

Time  of  Commencing, — Students  can  commence  at  any  time,  as  there  are  no 

vacations. 

Individual  Instrnction. — Each  Student  receives  individual  instruction. 

Pr*>parator7  Education, — A  knowledge  of  the  ordinary  hranches  is  sufficient, 
preparatory  to  entering  upon  the  course  of  studies. 

Terms. — Tuition,  payable  in  advance,  by  purchase  of  Scholarship— Commercial 
Course,  $40  ;  Penmanship,  $10. 

Review. — Students  holding  a  Scholarship  for  the  full  course,  can  review  at  any 
time  without  additional  charge. 

Graduatrs  —Students  who  complete  the  entire  course  and  pass  the  requisite  ex- 
amiuatiuD,  will  receive  Diplomas,  and  no  others. 

Stationery. — The  books,  paper,  &c.,  necessary  for  completing  the  full  course,  will 
cost  from  $5  to  $12,  depending  upon  the  quality  of  the  articles  purchased. 

Boarding. — Good  board  in  private  families  can  always  be  secured  by  application 
at  the  College  Rooms,  at  from  $3  to  $4  per  week. 

Time  Rrqnired. — The  time  required  to  complete  the  full  course  varies  with  dif- 
ferent persons,  and  ranges  from  12  to  14  weeks. 

Sessional* — Morning  session  from  8  to  12  ;  afternoon  session,  from  1  1-2  to  4  1-2 
evening  session,  from  7  to  9. 

Employment- — The  Principals  and  Teachers  of  this  Chain  of  Colleges  have  an 
extensive  acquh,intance  in  eight  larare  cities,  and  always  consider  it  a  pleasure  to  fur- 
ther the  best  interests  of  their  graduates. 

To  Whom  rr  may  Coxckrn  :  Cooper  I.vsTiTtrrH,  New  York,  Nov.  30,  1859. 

It  affords  me  pleasuie  to  state  that  Messrs.  Bryant,  Stratton  &  Packard  have,  for  a 
year  past,  had  in  operation  a  branch  of  Bryant,  Stratton  &  Co.'s  Chain  of  National 
Mercantile  Colleges,  in  the  Cooper  Institute  ;  and  that  it  has  been  eminently  successful, 
and  promises  to  be  an  important  adjunct  to  the  educational  interests  of  the  City  of 
New  York  and  the  country  at  large.  I  have  found  these  gentlemen  honorable  and 
straightforward  in  their  dealings,  and  am  fully  persuaded  that  they  are  thoroughly  im- 
bued with  a  sense  of  the  importance  of  'heir  profession.  That  this  is  the  prevailing 
sentiment,  is  evident  from  the  class  of  patronatje  which  they  have  received,  and 
are  receiving,  at  this  point.  They  have  now  a  large  class  in  attendance,  including  the 
sons  of  some  of  our  most  eminent  merchants  and  professional  men,  and  I  have  no  ooubt 
of  their  ability  to  sustain  themselves  in  their  present  high  reputation,  and  to  fulfill 
any  reasonable  anticipations  of  success  in  their  enterprise  of  establishing  a  Mercan- 
tile College  in  the  important  commercial  ci^es  of.  the  Union.  Messrs.  Bryant,  Strat- 
ton &  Packard  are  worthy  the  sympathy  and  co  operation  of  all  good  men. 

Respectfully,  PETER  COOPER. 

"We  fully  concur  in  the  above  statement : 

DANIEL  F.  TIEM.\NN. 
WILSON  G.  HUNT. 


lilbiMMMiHl 


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1 


A  FBSE  LIBRARY  of  Swedenborg's  Works  and  other  New  Church 
writings  may  be  consulted  daily  (except  Sundays,)  at  the  Room  mentioned 
below,  from  8  to  12  A.  M.,  and  2  to  6  P.  M.  N.  B.  Books  may  be  taken 
home  by  making  a  deposit  oi  their  value.  * 


SWEDENBORG'S   THEOLOGICAL  WRITINGS^ 

UNIFORM  OCTAVO  EDITION. 


PUBLISHED  BT   THE 


Room.  No.  J20,  Cooper  Institute,  New  York. 


-•♦»- 


Arcana  Coelestia  :    The  Heavenly  Arcana  contained  in 

the  Holy  Scriptures  or  Word  of  the  Lord,  unfolded  ;  together  with 
wonderful  Things  seen  and  heard  in  the  World  of  Spirits  and  in 
the  Heaven  of  Angels — (10  vols.,  80  cents  each.  PostaJ^e  averaging 
88  cents  each.) 

This  is  Swedenborg '«  great  work — the  largest  and  most  comprehenBive  of  all  his 
works.  Its  grand  purpose  in  to  unfold  the  spiritual  sense  of  the  i^acred  Scripture. 
And,  at  the  close  of  each  chapter,  are  given  interesting  relations  of  things  seen  and 
heard  in  the  spiritual  world — as.  concerning  the  process  of  dying,  the  resurrection  of 
man,  and  his  entrance  ioto  eternal  life  ;  concerning  the  nature  and  life  of  the  soul ; 
concerning  heaven  and  heavenlj  joy  ;  concerning  hell,  its  nature  and  its  miseries  ; 
concerning  spheres  in  the  other  life  ;  concerning  the  light  and  heat  in  which  the 
angels  live,  and  their  paradisiacal  scenery  ;  concerning  Tisions  and  dreams,  including 
the  prophetical  ones  recorded  in  the  Word  ;  concerning  the  last  judgment ;  concerning 
memory  in  the  other  life  ;  concerning  the  conditionof  the  Mahometans  and  Heathen 
in  the  other  world  ;  concerning  man's  freedom  ;  concerning  representations  and  cor- 
respondenees  ;  concerning  the  G  and  Man,  or  the  whole  angelic  heaven,  and  the  cor- 
respondence of  the  different  societies  therein  with  the  different  organs  and  senses  of 
the  human  body  ;  concerning  the  origin  and  correspondence  of  diseases  ;  concerning 
the  spirits  and  inhabitants  of  the  various  planets,  and  of  other  earths  in  the  starry 
heavens. 

Apocalypse  Revealed,  wherein  are  disclosed  the  Arcana 
there  foretold,  which  have  heretofore  remained  concealed,  (2  vols. 
Price,  76  cents  a  volume.     Postage,  32  cents  each.) 

The  design  of  this  work  is  to  unfold  the  spiritual  sense  of  the  Apocalypse  or  Book 
of  Revelation,  as  that  of  Genesis  and  Exodus  is  unfolded  in  the  Arcana  Coelestia.  Tha 
author  professei*  not  to  have  given  kisoum  explication  of  the  meaning  of  this  remarka- 
hie  Book  but  simply  what  was  communicated  to  him  from  thelord  through  an  especial 
illumination.  In  commencing  his  Preface,  he  says  :  "Not  a  few  have  labored  at  the 
explication  of  the  Apocalypse  ;  but  as  they  were  unacquainted  with  the  spiritual  sense 
of  the  Word,  they  could  not  discern  the  arcana  which  it  contains,  seeing  that  these 
can  only  be  unfolded  by  the  spiritual  sense. " 

And  it  may  with  truth  be  said  of  this — what  cannot  be  said  of  any  other  explication 
of  the  Apociilypse  ever  attempted — that  it  gives  a  rational  con.sistent,  and  coherent 
meaning  to  this  Book  rendering  plain  and  luminous  what  before  has  been  confessedly 
unintelligible  and  dark. — Instractive  ijarratives  of  things  seen  in  the  spiritual  world, 
are  also  interspersed  between  the  chapters. 

Heaven  and  its  Wonders,  the  World  of  Spirits,  and  Hell ; 

from  things  seen  and  heard,  [commonly  called  "  Heaven  and  Hell."] 
(With  a  copious  Alphabetical  Index.  1  Vol.  Price,  50  cts.  Postage, 
28  cts.) 

This  work  unfolds  the  laws  of  the  spiritual  world,  describes  the  condition  of  both 
food  and  evil  spirits  and  exhibits  the  general  arrangement  of  the  inhabitants  of  both 
bMiTsn  and  hall,  c  id  tha  ccenery  by  whith  they  are  surrounded.    It  treats  among 


I 


2 

eth«r  things,  of  the  form  of  hearen  in  general  and  in  particular,  of  the  innumerable 
■oeieties  of  which  the  whole  heaven  consists,  and  of  the  correspondence  between  the 
things  of  heaven  and  those  of  earth  ;  of  the  Sun  of  heaven,  and  the  light  and  heat 
thenee  proceeding  ;  of  fepresentative  appearances  in  heaven,  and  of  the  changes  of 
state  eiperienced  by  the  angels  ;  of  their  garments  and  habitations,  their  language 
and  wntinge,  their  innocence  and  wisdom,  their  government,  worship,  and  state  of 
peace  ;  of  the  origin  of  the  angelic  heaven,  and  its  conjunction  with  the  human  race 
by  means  of  the  Word  ;  of  the  state  of  the  Heathen  and  young  children,  of  the  rich 
and  poor,  and  of  the  wise  and  simple,  in  heaven  ;  of  the  occupations  of  the  angels  • 
Of  t»«»veniy  joj  and  happiness  ;  and  of  the  immensity  of  heaven.  It  also  treats  of  the 
World  of  fcpirits,  or  first  state  of  man  after  death,  and  the  successive  changes  which 
ne  nas  to  pass  through  subsequently;  of  the  nature  of  hell,  and  the  true  Scripture 
Bigmfication  of  the  devil,  satan  hell  fire,  and  the  gnashing  of  teeth  ;  of  the  appear- 
ance,  situation  and  plurality  of  the  hells  ;  and  of  the  dreadful  wickedness  and  direful 
arts  Of  infernal  spirits ;— presenting  altogether  a  ratienal  and  complete  system  of 
rneumatology,  and  one  in  perfect  harmony  with  the  teachings  of  Holy  Scripture. 

The  True  Christian  Religion,  containing  the  Universal 

Theology  of  the  New  Church,  foretold  by  the  Lord  in  the  Apocalypse 
xxi.  1,  2,  (with  the  Coronis  and  a  copious  Index.     1  Vol.  pp.  982 
Price,  $1.25.    Postage,  62  cts.) 

,  This  volume—the  hist  that  Swedenborg  wrote— contains  a  summary  of  all  the 
nnncipal  doctrines  of  the  New  Church,  signified  by  the  New  Jerusalem  in  the  Apoca- 
lypse. It  is  divided  into  fourteen  chapters,  which  treat  of  the  following  subjects  in  a 
simple  and  lucid  style,  and  with  convincing  argument.  I.— God,  the  Creator.  H  — 
m\c°^^'  ***^  Redeemer.  IH.- The  Holy  Spirit  and  the  Divine  Operation  (treating  also 
of  the  Divme  Trinity).    IV.— The  Sacred  Scripture  or  Word  of  the  Lord.     V  —The 

Decalogue  explained  as  to  its  external  and  internal  sense.     VI.— Faith.     VII Charity 

and  good  works.  VIII.— Free  Will.  IX.— Repentance.  X.— Reformation  and  Regen- 
eration. XI.— ImpuUtion.  Xn.— Baptism  XIII.— The  Holy  Supper.  XIV —The  Con- 
summation of  the  Age,  the  Second  Coming  of  the  Lord,  the  New  Heaven  and  the  New 
Church. 

In  addition  to  this,  there  are  upwards  of  seventy  Memorable  Relations,  a  Supplement 
concerning  the  spiritual  world,  and  a  copious  Index  to  the  whole  work  of  about  100 
pages. 

Angelic  Wisdom  concerning  the  Divine  Providence.     (1 

Vol.  pp.  274,  with  Alphabetical  Index.    Price,  45  cts.    Postage, 
21  cts.) 

This  work  treats  of  the  nature  and  operations  of  the  Divine  Providence,  and  unlWds 
S*i*r'  ^i  °^^*^  according  to  which  God's  moral  government  is  regulated.  It  shews 
that  the  Divine  Providence  has  for  an  end  a  heaven  of  angels  from  the  human  raee  • 
that  it  works  not  at  random,  but  according  to  certain  invariable  Laws  which  are  here 
disclosed  ;  that  it  is  universal,  extending  to  the  least  things  as  well  as  to  the  greatest  • 
that  in  all  it  does,  it  has  respect  to  what  is  eternal  with  man,  and  to  things  temporary 
only  for  the  sake  of  what  is  eternal ;  that  the  laws  of  Permission  are  also  among  the 
laws  of  the  Divine  Providence  ;  that  evils  are  permitted  for  the  sake  of  the  end,  which 
18  salvation  ;  that  the  Divine  Providence  is  equally  with  the  wicked  and  the  good  • 
IS  *  fZ®*"^  ™*°  ""^^  ^^  reformed,  and  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  predestination  • 
that  the  Lord  cannot  act  against  the  Laws  of  his  Providence,  because  to  act  against 
them,  would  be  to  act  against  his  Divine  Love  and  his  Divine  Wisdom,  consequentlv 
against  Himself.  ' 

These  and  other  tofics  of  a  kindred  nature  are  treated  in  an  exhaustive,  and  at  the 
same  time  lucid  and  masterly  manner,  in  this  volume. 

Conjugial  Love  and  its  Chaste  Delights  ;  also  Adulterous 

Love  and  its  Sinful  Pleasures,  (1  Vol.,  with  Alphabetical  Index. 
Price,  75  cts.    Postage,  31  cts.) 

X  work  which  treats  of  the  relation  of  the  sexes,  and  the  indissoluble  nature  of 
true  marriage  ;  of  the  nature  and  origin  of  love  truly  conjugial ;  of  the  marriage  of 
tne  Lord  and  the  Church,  and  its  correspondence  ;  of  the  conjunction  of  souls  br 
?f*^'tv\"°v^**  they  are  no  longer  two,  but  one  flesh  ;  of  the  change  of  the  state  of 
lite  with  both  sexos  by  marriage  ;  of  the  causes  of  disaffection,  separations,  and  di- 
Torces  in  marriage  ;  of  the  causes  of  apparent  love,  friendship  and  favor  in  marriages  - 
•na  Of  Iterated  marriages.  To  which  is  added  a  treatise  on  Adulterous  or  Scortatory 
ijve  in  its  various  degrees,  showing  it  to  be  in  its  nature  the  very  opposite  of  Conju 
pal  liOve— as  opposite  as  the  natural  man  is  to  the  spiritual,  or  as  heaven  is  to  hell. 


elJding  man  a.  the  chief  eiid  of  creatum     It  exp  ^^.^^  ^^.^^  . 

Trinity,  also  o  the  ^^J^^J'^D^tHne  of  iCrees,  and  explaiD.  the  three  discrete  de- 
Divine,  .t  tinfolds  also  ^.^•.^^.^""*  ^.n  and  bV  what  means  these  are  opened,  and 
grees  of  the  human  mind,  s^.^^'^K  'l^Jther  wveaU  the  origin  of  ev.l  use.,  also  the 
Vhat  is  effected  by  t^eir  opening.  It  f"^^*^*^^  ^^;*^*f  ,^^,  ^ork  or  of  the  -  Doctr  ne  of 
origin,  design,  and  tendency  ^^  K°^J  "**„\hor  of  the  -  Foregleams  of  Immortality  " 
Deirees"  herein  di«c"«sed,  that  the  author  oii  8^^^^  the  amaring  swee^ 

Jerusalem  and  ite  Hea^enly^wirl      ,         j^^^^t,  and  Continu- 
Si^r^I^'o'^t^'r^.^nV^th^o  Live;se.  (making  a 

The  first  of  these  contains  a  B«m°"Y  therrthe  wme  doctrines  are  more  fully  un- 
with  copious  references  to  the  Arcana  wh„^^  ^^^^  doctrines  in  contrast 

folded.    The  second  exhibit,  some  of  the  more  ^   P«  ^^  ^^^^^  showing  how 

with  those  of  the  ^P^,'""  Christian  Churcn.     ine  ^  ^^^  ^^^^  operates  upon 

the  spiritual  flows  »°5Vt  «  Tn^X^atSre  a^^  of  the  Last  GeneralJudgment, 

the  body.    The  fourth  !?P\*»^"  ^|®i,^^^^  when  al.o  the  New  Dispensation  known 

which  occurred  m  the  ^of^*^  ^f^^P'^^The  fifth  unfolds  the  spiritual  meaning  of  ihe 
as  the  New  Jerusalem    commenced^  The  fift^^^^  ^^P.^^^  references  to  the 

White  Horse  m^-ntioned  m  ^^  « .  JP^^^ryP^^i^        The  sixth  describes  the  appearance, 
Arcana  where  the  f^^f  J*  "/^'^^^^J^^J^^^^^^  other  earths,  with  whom  the  author 

£:;raVua?n^d^Vr;u  h  l^il^Ste-rcourse  with  spirits  from  those  earths  . 

The  Four  Leading  Doctrines  of  the  New  Church- viz., 

and  the  Holy  Spuit.     ^'- .J'"  .  „.t,^  i,    s,eaenb<,rg  bim«U 

"fe  ••  Kr^»1  .^A^if«U  a.".-  -a  '"  harg.  ..  advance  .a«ci.o. 
??;JJ,Ib!rM  them  for  thiirtroable  and  expense.. 


COLLATERAL  NEW  CHURCH  WORKS 

FOE  SALl, 

AT  ROOM  NO.  20,  COOPER  INSTITUTE,  NEW  YORK. 

XT  1.1 0'=   Annoal  ic  behalf  of  the  Doctrines  of  the  mvr 

New  Jerusalem.  ^  ,    -, 

xr^v^io^a  Plpnarv  Inspiration  of  the  Scriptures  Assertea, 

^^^aidL^SL'^^^^^^^^^^  competition  inves.^^^^^     With  Appen- 
dL,  Ulustrative  aiKl  critical.     Pnce,  $l.oO. 


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